Belmont Law Review
Volume 1 Symposium 2013: Tennessee Legal Reform

Article 11

2014

Whose Rights Should Prevail? Toward a ChildCentric Approach to Revocation of Birthparent
Consent in Domestic Infant Abortion
David L. Thibodeaux
Belmont University - College of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.belmont.edu/lawreview
Part of the Legal Writing and Research Commons
Recommended Citation
Thibodeaux, David L. (2014) "Whose Rights Should Prevail? Toward a Child-Centric Approach to Revocation of Birthparent
Consent in Domestic Infant Abortion," Belmont Law Review: Vol. 1 , Article 11.
Available at: https://repository.belmont.edu/lawreview/vol1/iss1/11

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Law at Belmont Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Belmont Law Review by an authorized editor of Belmont Digital Repository. For more information, please contact repository@belmont.edu.

WHOSE RIGHTS SHOULD PREVAIL?
TOWARD A CHILD-CENTRIC APPROACH TO
REVOCATION OF BIRTHPARENT CONSENT IN
DOMESTIC INFANT ADOPTION
DAVID L. THIBODEAUX*

INTRODUCTION ..........................................................................................344	
  
I. ADOPTION IN GENERAL .........................................................................346	
  
II. THE HISTORIC PERSPECTIVE ................................................................348	
  
III. POLICY CONCERNS: COMPETING INTERESTS AND RIGHTS OF THE
VARIOUS ACTORS ........................................................................352	
  
A. Birthparents’ Interests .............................................................353	
  
B. Adoptive Parents’ Interests .....................................................356	
  
C. The Interests of the Child ........................................................358	
  
IV. CURRENT STATUTES GOVERNING INFANT ADOPTION IN THE UNITED
STATES .........................................................................................362	
  
A. Liberal Construction of Consent and Revocation ...................364	
  
B. States That Have Adopted a Quasi-Uniform Adoption Act
Approach ...............................................................................365	
  
C. Narrow Construction of Consent and Revocation...................366	
  
D. Other Approaches ...................................................................367	
  
V. PROPOSAL: WHICH STATUTORY SCHEME IS “LEAST DETRIMENTAL” TO
THE CHILD’S INTERESTS?.............................................................368
A. Proposed Statute......................................................................369
B. Rationale..................................................................................378
CONCLUSION .............................................................................................379
APPENDIX A: SURVEY OF RELEVANT CONSENT AND REVOCATION
STATUTES BY STATE ....................................................................381
APPENDIX B: PROPOSED STATUTE............................................................394	
  

*
J.D., Magna Cum Laude, Belmont University College of Law (2014). I owe a debt
of gratitude to my wife, Toni, for her patience, understanding, and help, and to my children,
Emily, Elinore, David, Camille, and Natalie, for blessing my days. I would also like to thank
the Belmont Law Review staff for their dedication and excellence in blazing a trail for the
future of this journal.

343

344

BELMONT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 1: 343

INTRODUCTION
Laws governing infant adoption in the United States have
undergone dramatic changes over the past several decades. A number of
high-profile legal custody battles1 between birthparents and adoptive
parents in the late 1980s and early 1990s created media spectacle followed
by public outcry.2 Courts seemed to be torn between conflicting legal goals:
the solidly established right to parent formed by the biological bond
between a person and his or her natural offspring, enforceability of contract
1. For example, in Petition of Doe, 638 N.E.2d 181 (Ill. 1994), the Illinois Supreme
Court reversed the findings of the trial court, returning four-year-old “Baby Richard” to his
natural father after finding that the adoptive parents and their attorney had not made
sufficient effort to notify him of the adoption proceedings. The trial court had found that the
natural father’s consent to adoption was not needed when he failed to show interest in the
child during the first 30 days of the child’s life, despite the fact that he was out of the
country during the pregnancy and the child’s mother had told him that the child had died.
The “Baby Richard” case became the impetus for Illinois’ putative father registry. Likewise,
Matter of Baby M., 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1998), created fanfare when a surrogacy contract
conflicted with public policy in allowing monetary gain through adoption. The natural father
did not have a custody right superseding the rights of the surrogate mother through
biological connection alone, but a best interests of the child analysis, particularly in light of
surrogate mother’s willingness to sell her story to the media, justified awarding custody to
the natural father, with visitation granted to the surrogate mother. Finally, “Baby Jessica”
was taken from her adoptive home at the age of two and a half after the Supreme Court of
Michigan held in In re Clausen, 502 N.W.2d 649 (Mich. 1993), that neither the adoptive
parents nor the child had standing to demand a best interests hearing, but that such a hearing
would only be considered on determination of unfitness of the natural parents. There was
evidence that the adoption attorney obtained the birthmother’s consent before expiration of
the 72-hour statutory waiting period, and that the birthfather was not notified of the adoption
proceedings. The adoptive parents were treated as third-party strangers to the child, though
their home was the only home she had known her entire life.
2. See, e.g., Darlene Gavron Stevens, Adoption Reformers Target Baby Richard
Case, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 6, 1994, § 2, at 1; Janan Hanna, 1 Year Later, Legacy of Baby Richard
Case Is Fear, CHI. TRIB., April 29, 1996, § 1, at 1 (“What if the birth parents change their
mind? What if a biological father resurfaces and a judge invalidates the adoption? Would it
be less risky to adopt from a foreign country?”); Iver Peterson, Baby M’s Future, N.Y.
TIMES, April 5, 1987, § 4, at 1 (“Last week, in a decision that created law in the legislative
vacuum surrounding surrogate motherhood, Judge Harvey R. Sorkow of New Jersey
Superior Court awarded custody of one-year-old Baby M to William Stern, the child’s
natural father, and his wife, Elizabeth. He stripped Mary Beth Whitehead, the surrogate
mother, of all parental rights, and ruled that the contract she had signed with the Sterns—and
reneged on—was legal,” despite material misrepresentations by the Sterns); Justice for All in
the Baby M Case, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 1988, at A26 (“At a stroke, New Jersey’s Supreme
Court brought clarity and justice to the Baby M case, which so tormented the nation last
spring: Mary Beth Whitehead-Gould retains her rights as a parent. William Stern and his
wife retain the right to raise his child. New Jersey acquires a convincing judgment that a
‘surrogate parent’ contract for money amounts to an illegal bill of sale for a baby.”); Jon D.
Hull, The Ties That Traumatize, TIME MAG., April 12, 1993, at 48 (“Sometime before
midnight on April 20, two-year-old Jessica DeBoer of Ann Arbor, Michigan, is scheduled to
disappear, leaving behind a heartbroken couple she calls Mommy and Daddy, a dog named
Miles, her yellow bedroom and just about everything she has ever known . . . to begin life
anew as Anna Lee Schmidt.”).
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in adoption and surrogacy agreements, and an ever-evolving “best interests
of the child” determination which, at times, seemed to give the courts an ad
hoc power to override all other considerations.3 No uniform approach to
adoption of infants exists among the fifty states. In the midst of heightened
public awareness of adoption controversy, the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (“Uniform Law Commission”)
submitted its 1994 version of the Uniform Adoption Act.4 The Act has been
the subject of much commentary over the past two decades, but has only
been enacted in one state, and the current consent and revocation statutes in
that jurisdiction do not reflect their counterparts in the Uniform Adoption
Act.5
In particular, the high-profile cases that captured media attention
and involved withdrawal—or attempted withdrawal—of birthparent consent
to adoption seem to have had more impact on the shaping of subsequent
adoption legislation governing birthparent consent and revocation of
birthparent consent than the approach taken by the Uniform Law
Commission. For example, in 2007 the Supreme Court of Illinois credited
the “Baby Richard” case from 19946 with prompting the legislature to
change Illinois adoption laws and to create the state’s putative father
registry.7 The purpose of the resulting laws was to “give protection to both
the biological parents and the adoptive parents . . . not jeopardizing either
group.”8 “[T]he thrust of the Bill . . . is to put some type of . . . finality and
some type of predictability into our adoption laws as they exist right now.”9
Two decades later, though overhaul of adoption laws across the
United States has been nearly universal, there is still no uniformity among
the states in approach to voluntary relinquishment of parental rights: the
very issue at the heart of the controversial cases that sparked reform.10 This
Note attempts to track the development of domestic adoption laws as they
affect birthparent consent in infant adoptions, the competing policies
driving these developments, and the way states have attempted to reconcile
that friction. Part I of this Note provides an underpinning of adoption
3. Carrie L. Wambaugh, Biology Is Important, But Does Not Necessarily Always
Constitute a “Family”: A Brief Survey of the Uniform Adoption Act, 32 AKRON L. REV. 791,
828 (1999) (“[T]here is no mandatory overall rule of construction for applying the ‘best
interests’ standard”).
4. UNIF. ADOPTION ACT, 9 U.L.A. 11 (Supp. 2013). The 1994 version replaced the
original 1953 Act and its 1969 amended version.
5. See John J. Sampson, Uniform Family Laws and Model Acts, 42 FAM. L.Q. 673,
684 (2008); see also UNIF. ADOPTION ACT, 9 U.L.A. 11–15.
6. See supra note 1.
7. J.S.A. v. M.H., 863 N.E.2d 236, 251 (Ill. 2007).
8. Id. (quoting The 88th Ill. Gen. Assem., House Proceedings, June 30, 1994, at 115
(statement of Rep. Wojcik)) (brackets omitted).
9. Id. (quoting The 88th Ill. Gen. Assem., House Proceedings, June 30, 1994, at 115
(statement of Rep. Dart)).
10. See infra APPENDIX A: Survey of Relevant Consent and Revocation Statutes by
State (describing the disparity in approaches of consent and revocation statutes).
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terminology by outlining the actors involved, the basic elements required
for infant adoption in the United States, and how birthparent consent fits in
the mix. Part II gives a brief historical background of adoption statutes in
the United States, including more recent attempts at uniformity in adoption
laws across the fifty states. In Part III, this Note addresses competing policy
interests and the friction that arises among the dueling rights of the various
actors in the adoption process. Part III also attempts to grasp a firm
definition of the ever-elusive “best interests of the child” standard, taking
the position that the child’s interest in stability and permanency must be the
ultimate goal of the law in the adoption context. Part IV categorizes current
statutes across the fifty states into three distinct groups, drawing heavily on
data compiled in APPENDIX A concerning certain identified criteria in each
state’s adoption laws. Finally, Part V proposes a model statute that falls
squarely into the most conservative of these categories, balancing the
interests and rights of the various actors with the best interests of the child
being held paramount. The proposal argues, first, for only a very brief delay
of birthparent consent after the child’s birth and, second, for no subsequent
revocation period. Though the primary purpose of this limitation is stability
for the child, this Note will show that this design best serves each of the
other actors as well.
I. ADOPTION IN GENERAL
Fundamental to a discussion of reform to laws governing consent
and revocation in adoption proceedings is identification of the actors
involved. Adoption brings about a unique relationship for a limited—or in
some cases, protracted—period of time between three distinct entities with
varying and sometimes conflicting rights and interests. Commonly known
among adoption professionals as the “adoption triad,” the parties to this
relationship are the child, the birthparents, and the adoptive parents.11
Various other players may become involved on behalf of one or more of
these actors: the court, a state or private agency, or a lawyer. But the needs
and rights of the members of the triad are what are at issue here.
Joan Heifetz Hollinger, adoption advocate and co-drafter of the
1994 Uniform Adoption Act, writes:
Adoptive relationships have six principal elements, each of
which is said to be a necessary legal prerequisite for, or a
consequence of, adoption, or a socially and psychologically
desirable characteristic of adoption. These are: (1) the
necessity of parental consent from a child’s original
parents—usually referred to as “birth parents”—or a sound
basis for terminating parental rights, as a jurisdictional
11. See Adoption Triad, ADOPTION.COM, www.adoption.com/topics/adoption-triad
(last visited Dec. 24, 2013).
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prerequisite for an adoption proceeding; (2) selection of
suitable adoptive parent(s) in order to serve the child’s best
interests; (3) the characterization of adoption as a noncontractual “gift” and not a bargained-for-exchange; (4) the
“asserted-equivalence” doctrine, that an adoptive parentchild relationship replaces “in all respects” the child’s
relationship to her birth family; (5) the confidentiality of
adoption proceedings and records; (6) the permanence and
autonomy of adoptive relationships, subject to the same
statutory and constitutional protections that would initially
apply to a child’s original family.12
It is to the first of these elements that this Note is dedicated, though each of
the others certainly comes to bear in the analysis. While it is hardly possible
to discuss child custody without, for example, bringing in a discussion of
the “best interests of the child” standard, of primary significance, at least in
its status as a threshold matter if not in importance, is the determination of
birthparent consent to adoption, alternately referred to as voluntary
relinquishment of parental rights: “Because of the fundamental nature of
parental rights, the issue of the requirement of parental consent to an
adoption is determined without regard for the best interests of the child.”13
Adoption proceedings can only commence if parental rights are first
terminated, either voluntarily by consent or relinquishment, or involuntarily
through a state-initiated termination proceeding for unfitness.14
“[E]ver since the first adoption statutes were enacted in the 1850s,
parental consent, or a legitimate reason for dispensing with the need for
consent, has been an essential, albeit not a sufficient, jurisdictional
prerequisite for a valid adoption.”15 But many questions revolving around
birthparent consent remain unanswered: Who must give consent? When is a
birthfather’s consent required? When can consent be given, and to whom?
Is consent final at the moment it is given, or should there be a period of
time for the birthparent to change his or her mind? And what procedures
should be implemented to guard against abuse of birthparent vulnerability
during the time of consent?

12. Joan Heifetz Hollinger, State and Federal Adoption Laws, in FAMILIES BY LAW:
AN ADOPTION READER 37, 38–39 (Naomi R. Cahn & Joan Heifetz Hollinger eds., 2004).
13. In re Adoption of T.L.C., 46 P.3d 863, 870 (Wyo. 2002) (citations omitted).
14. Id. at 868.
15. Naomi R. Cahn & Joan Heifetz Hollinger, Introduction to FAMILIES BY LAW: AN
ADOPTION READER, supra note 12, at 4.
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II. THE HISTORIC PERSPECTIVE
Adoption was not a recognized practice under British common
law.16 Rather, orphans were cared for through indentured servitude,
apprenticeships, or as wards of the state in publicly funded orphanages.17
These practices were subsequently imported to America and held sway
through much of the nineteenth century.18 But statutes enabling adoption
began to be enacted in many states in response to specific individual needs
arising in legislative petitions: particularly, petitions for name change and
inheritance rights for wards of individuals unrelated or tenuously related by
blood.19 These were particularized, rather than general statutes, and only
effective for the particular private adoption each authorized.20 In 1850,
Texas enacted a more generalized statute that allowed a person to file an
adoption petition with the court, but it only covered inheritance rights in its
scope.21
Experts recognize An Act to Provide for the Adoption of Children,
enacted by the Massachusetts legislature in 1851, as the first modern
American adoption statute.22 The Act provided for a much broader
treatment of adoption, including a comprehensive look at such modern
adoption concepts as who may adopt, who may be adopted, the necessity
for consent in writing, a prohibition against a married person adopting a
child without his spouse’s assent, filing of an adoption petition with the
court, a final decree of adoption issued by the court, rights and status of the
adopted child as a full member of the adoptive family “as if such child had
been born in lawful wedlock of such parents,” and severance of birthparent
rights.23 Though the Act makes no mention of a “best interests of the child”
16. Janet Hopkins Dickson, Comment, The Emerging Rights of Adoptive Parents:
Substance or Specter?, 38 UCLA L. REV. 917, 923 (1991).
17. Id. Enter the picture of Dickens’ novels and Victorian mothers stealing away in the
night, leaving their infants in orphanage doorways to be cared for.
18. Id.
19. See Naomi R. Cahn, Perfect Substitutes or the Real Thing?, in FAMILIES BY LAW:
AN ADOPTION READER 19, supra note 12, at 19–20 [hereinafter Cahn, Perfect Substitutes].
20. Id. at 20.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 22–23.
23. The Act reads, in its entirety:
BE it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives, in General
Court assembled, and by the authority of the same, as follows:
Sect. 1. Any inhabitant of this Commonwealth may petition the judge of
probate, in the county wherein he or she may reside, for leave to adopt a
child not his or her own by birth.
Sect. 2. If both or either of the parents of such child shall be living, they
or the survivor of them, as the case may be, shall consent in writing to
such adoption: if neither parent be living, such consent may be given by
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standard, many of the elements reviewed in a modern best interests analysis
are present in its language, and subsequent legislation modeled after the
Massachusetts Act began to explicitly include considerations for the
welfare of the child.24
the legal guardian of such child; if there be no legal guardian, no father
nor mother, the next of kin of such child within the State may give such
consent; and if there be no such next of kin, the judge of probate may
appoint some discreet and suitable person to act in the proceedings as the
next friend of such child, and give or withhold such consent.
Sect. 3. If the child be of the age of fourteen years or upwards, the
adoption shall not be made without his or her consent.
Sect. 4. No petition by a person having a lawful wife shall be allowed
unless such wife shall join therein, and no woman having a lawful
husband shall be competent to present and prosecute such petition.
Sect. 5. If, upon such petition, so presented and consented to as
aforesaid, the judge of probate shall be satisfied of the identity and
relations of the persons, and that the petitioner, or, in case of husband
and wife, the petitioners, are of sufficient ability to bring up the child,
and furnish suitable nurture and education, having reference to the
degree and condition of its parents, and that it is fit and proper that such
adoption should take effect, he shall make a decree setting forth the said
facts, and ordering that, from and after the date of the decree, such child
should be deemed and taken, to all legal intents and purposes, the child
of the petitioner or petitioners.
Sect. 6. A child so adopted, as aforesaid, shall be deemed, for the
purposes of inheritance and succession by such child, custody of the
person and right of obedience by such parent or parents by adoption, and
all other legal consequences and incidents of the natural relation of
parents and children, the same to all intents and purposes as if such child
had been born in lawful wedlock of such parents or parent by adoption,
saving only that such child shall not be deemed capable of taking
property expressly limited to the heirs of the body or bodies of such
petitioner or petitioners.
Sect. 7. The natural parent or parents of such child shall be deprived, by
such decree of adoption, of all legal rights whatsoever as respects such
child; and such child shall be freed from all legal obligations of
maintenance and obedience, as respects such natural parent or parents.
Sect. 8. Any petitioner, or any child which is the subject of such a
petition, by any next friend, may claim and prosecute an appeal to the
supreme judicial court from such decree of the judge of probate, in like
manner and with the like effect as such appeals may now be claimed and
prosecuted in cases of wills, saying only that in no case shall any bond
be required of, nor any costs awarded against, such child or its next
friend so appealing. [Approved by the Governor, May 24, 1851.]
Law of May 24, 1851, ch. 324, 1851 Mass. Acts 815.
24. Cahn, Perfect Substitutes, supra note 19, at 23.
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As modern adoption statutes developed in all fifty states through
the latter part of the nineteenth and early part of the twentieth centuries,
legislators sought to satisfy competing interests among the various actors,
but with the primary goals being the child’s best interests and the protection
of biological parents’ constitutional rights in the securing of informed,
voluntary consent.25 The results, however, were varied as the states’
approaches to adoption regulation sought to reconcile the complex and
“conflicting mixture of competing rights” that ultimately led to the series of
highly-publicized decisions in various jurisdictions outlined above.26 Such
anomalies raised public awareness and sparked a cry for reform in
legislatures across the United States.
Also, until the latter part of the twentieth century, society found
acceptable certain harsh language to describe each member of the adoption
triad: The child was considered a “bastard” or “illegitimate,” the
birthmother was “promiscuous” or “irresponsible,” and the adoptive family
was “barren.”27 While the language has softened, much of the stereotype
and echoes of the stigma remain.28 In modern adoption, vestiges of
suspicion in public opinion linger, bleeding over into legislation which is
often overly wary of agency practice, adoptive and birthparent motives, and
a “gray market” view of much of adoption culture.29
In the wake of cries for reform and a need to renew public
sentiment about the institution of adoption, two separate and very different
movements developed, each attempting to reconcile variance in adoption
law across the United States: The Uniform Adoption Act (“UAA”)30 and
The Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children (“ICPC”).31 The UAA
was first enacted in 1953 and amended for the last time in 1994.32 The 1994
25. See Robin DuRocher, Balancing Competing Interests in Post-Placement Adoption
Custody Disputes: How Do the Scales of Justice Weigh the Rights of Biological Parents,
Adoptive Parents, and Children?, 15 J. LEGAL MED. 305, 309 (1994).
26. Id.
27. Dickson, supra note 16, at 926.
28. Id.
29. See id. at 934 (implying that all adoptions, whether agency or independent, have
been historically viewed through this skeptical lens); see also Independent Adoption,
ADOPTION.COM, http://www.encyclopedia.adoption.com/entry/independent-adoption/180/
1.html (last visited Dec. 30, 2013). See generally Melinda Lucas, Adoption: Distinguishing
Between Gray Market and Black Market Activities, 34 FAM. L.Q. 553–64 (2000) (discussing
that independent adoption—adoption facilitated by an intermediary, such as an attorney,
medical professional, member of the clergy, or other adoption facilitator, rather than a public
or private adoption agency—is sometimes called “gray market adoption” (a play on the term
“black market adoption” used to describe illegal activity) by its detractors).
30. UNIF. ADOPTION ACT, 9 U.L.A. 11 (Supp. 2013).
31. SECRETARIAT TO THE ASS’N OF ADM’RS OF THE INTERSTATE COMPACT ON THE
PLACEMENT OF CHILDREN, AM. PUB. HUMAN SERV. ASS’N, GUIDE TO THE INTERSTATE
COMPACT ON THE PLACEMENT OF CHILDREN 10 (2002), available at http://www.aphsa.org/
content/dam/AAICPC/PDF%20DOC/Resources/Guidebook_2002.pdf [hereinafter ICPC
GUIDE].
32. 9 U.L.A. 11, 133 (Supp. 2013).
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amendment really constituted an entire rewrite of the Act.33 It was intended
as “a comprehensive codification of adoption law, covering everything
from birth parent consent to adoption records confidentiality.”34
Commentators around the time of its final amendment hailed the 1994 Act
as “a major initiative in the field of children’s rights”35 that “strives to
provide some certainty in the quagmire of adoption law.”36 However, the
UAA never received much support in state legislatures and was
subsequently downgraded to a model act.37
The ICPC is a statutory agreement initiated in 1974 that has been
adopted and is currently utilized in all fifty states, as well as the District of
Columbia and the Virgin Islands.38 It seeks to guarantee that certain agreedupon practices take place before a child is transported from one state to
another.39 “The primary purpose of the ICPC is to ensure that children
placed out-of-state are placed with care-givers who are safe, suitable and
able to meet the child’s needs.”40 ICPC workers in each state involved in an
adoption evaluate a checklist of requirements that must be met as well as
the home study prepared for the adoption and other pertinent paperwork
before approving the removal of the child from his or her state of birth.41
While the ICPC does not resolve the issue of differences between adoption
requirements in various states, it has for decades provided a means for
working through the differences to provide as smooth a transition from one
jurisdiction to the next as is possible in the current regime.42 Effectively,
The ICPC has served as a stop-gap in the absence of uniformity among
state adoption laws.

33. Sampson, supra note 5, at 684 (“Despite the innovation found in many of its
provisions, the UAA immediately attracted controversy, not support. After quick enactment
by a single state, it soon fell into obscurity. The main complaints were an excess of
complexity, unacceptable alteration of known procedures, and the substantial length of the
text. Downgraded to a model act, it remains available on the NCCUSL website for review.”).
34. Adoption Act (1994), UNIFORM LAW COMMISSION, http://www.uniformlaws.org/
Act.aspx?title=Adoption%20Act%20%281994%29 (last visited Dec. 30, 2013).
35. Wambaugh, supra note 3, at 831.
36. Sarah Clarke Wixson, And Baby Makes Three: The Rights of the Child, the
Adoptive Parents and the Biological Parents Under the Uniform Adoption Act, 33 IDAHO L.
REV. 481, 497 (1997).
37. Sampson, supra note 5, at 684.
38. ICPC GUIDE, supra note 31, at 3.
39. Id. at 3–4.
40. ICPC FAQ, AM. PUB. HUMAN SERV. ASS’N, http://www.icpc.aphsa.org/content/
AAICPC/en/resources/ICPCFAQ.html (last visited Jan. 12, 2014).
41. ICPC GUIDE, supra note 31, at 4–5.
42. See generally ICPC GUIDE, supra note 31.
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III. POLICY CONCERNS: COMPETING INTERESTS
AND RIGHTS OF THE VARIOUS ACTORS
One commentator noted, “Two principal and widely accepted goals
of domestic infant adoption are (1) preventing the unnecessary separation of
family members by ensuring that birth parents make informed and
deliberate decisions and (2) protecting the finality of adoptive
placements.”43 However, as this argument is framed, it becomes necessary
to be ever mindful of a tendency to slip into a view of the child as
belonging, in a proprietary sense, to one set of parents or the other. Stability
and permanency and a sense of belonging are essential to the psychological
well-being of a child.44 While the parenting instinct is a natural desire to
protect those in our care who are most vulnerable, danger lies in the
parental tendency to become possessive to the point of overshooting the
interests of the child, with parental interests—whether biological or
adoptive—taking over:
The law’s commitment to respect parental rights does not
mean that children are to be regarded as property.
However, sometimes they are treated as such. This
misperception is reinforced by language that emphasizes
the rights rather than duties of adults. The filing of a birth
certificate is thought of as an assignment of a child to
adults rather than the other way around. Likewise, divorce
decrees award custody of the child to one of the competing
adults rather than awarding a custodial parent to the child.
The vocabulary of placement ought to be reconceptualized
to force focus where it belongs—on parental responsibility
to satisfy a child’s fundamental right to caring parents.
The child’s best interests will be served by providing the
least detrimental alternative.45
This should not be read to strip biological parents or adoptive parents of
their rights and interests. Rather, interests of the parents are subordinate in

43. Elizabeth J. Samuels, Time to Decide? The Laws Governing Mothers’ Consents to
the Adoption of Their Newborn Infants, 72 TENN. L. REV. 509, 511 (2005).
44. See JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN, ALBERT J. SOLNIT, SONJA GOLDSTEIN & ANNA FREUD, THE
BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD: THE LEAST DETRIMENTAL ALTERNATIVE 9 (The Free Press
1996).
45. Id. at 227–28.
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the adoption context to those of the child, except when—as would happen
without deviation in a perfect world—those interests run in concert.46
As the argument has been framed here—with a view of the conflict
as between keeping the biological family together for the sake of stability
for the child and, in cases where the biological family has been disrupted,
keeping the adoptive family together for the sake of stability for the child—
the crux of the conflict becomes the window of time when final decisions
for the child’s fate are being determined.47 Where the child’s interests are
the ultimate aim, resolution of this conflict can only be attained by
determining an elusive “if”: If the biological family is to remain together,
then it is in the child’s best interests for birthparents to be allowed generous
periods of time to consider consent to adoption as well as to revoke that
consent.48 But if the child is to ultimately be adopted, then it is in the child’s
best interests for the process to take place smoothly and quickly and
without threat of later disruption.49 Birthparents’ and adoptive parents’
interests each run parallel to both conflicting interests of the child, to a
degree, and “in a better society” would run entirely in congruity.50 But in
the real world in which we live, the various actors have divergent interests
in the time surrounding the birth and possible adoption of the child,51 and
often the child’s interests are in conflict with one another.52 At this point in
the analysis, a closer look at the interests of the various actors in the
adoption triad is warranted.
A. Birthparents’ Interests
Despite the stigma often attached to women who “give up their
babies” for adoption, the vast majority of birthmothers who seek an
adoption plan have made an immensely unselfish choice.53 Adoption is a
loving alternative to abortion, a carefully and deliberately considered
46. See id. at 228 (“Were we living in a better society, there would be no need for this
volume. But there is a need to try to contribute, even in a small way, to making our world a
little less unperfect for our children.”).
47. See generally id. at 41–45.
48. Naomi R. Cahn, Family Issue(s), in FAMILIES BY LAW: AN ADOPTION READER 270,
supra note 12, at 271 [hereinafter Cahn, Family Issue(s)].
49. Id.
50. See GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 44, at 228. Birthparents should desire finality in
adoption proceedings for the child. Likewise, adoptive parents should desire that
birthparents are afforded as much opportunity to make an informed decision as possible.
And both parties should hope for the ultimate outcome that will serve the child best.
51. Cahn, Family Issue(s), supra note 48, at 271 (“An emphasis on the rights of the
biological mother suggests a longer time period for reconsideration of adoption, while a
recognition of the rights of adoptive parents suggests that a shorter time period may be
appropriate.”).
52. See infra notes 94–97 and accompanying text.
53. National Council for Adoption, The Rights of Adopted Children Should Be
Protected, reprinted in ADOPTION: OPPOSING VIEWPOINTS 82, 83 (Mary E. Williams ed.
2006).
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option, and a decision not lightly entered into.54 “Society should honor and
respect birthparents, and especially birthmothers, for these loving, unselfish
decisions.”55
But blood ties are extremely hard to break, and birthparents should
be afforded every consideration when making such a lasting decision:
“[T]he earliest and most hallowed of the ties that bind humanity, in all
countries considered sacred, is the relationship of parent and child.
Therefore, parents have the first and natural right to their children.”56 And
the United States Supreme Court has long recognized the fundamental right
of a parent to order the welfare and upbringing of his or her offspring.57
Consent and revocation limits have been set in deference to this primary
relationship. But do they go far enough? Some commentators think not.
One recent study concluded that a later date before which a
birthmother is allowed to consent coupled with a prolonged revocation
period would better suit the birthmother’s interests.58 While this study
found that “there is no magic formula that perfectly balances the need for
deliberate and final decisions with the need to establish children in
permanent homes,” a timeframe consisting of four to seven days mandatory
waiting period before signing consent along with a minimum three week
revocation period would satisfy these conflicting goals adequately.59 The
finding was based in large part on a comparison between American models,
which, though disparate, trend toward shorter consent and revocation
periods, and European and Australian models, which trend toward longer
periods, averaging six to eight weeks.60 In particular, Professor Samuels
uses as an example a case where a younger birthmother gave valid consent
in Kansas, which allows consent a short time after birth (twelve hours) with
no possibility of revocation.61 Though there were suspicious circumstances
surrounding the adoption, Kansas courts ultimately found no evidence of
fraud or duress and dismissed the birthmother’s petition to set aside her
consent.62 The article goes on to compare the outcome of this Kansas case
with its hypothetical outcome in Victoria, Australia. 63 Though the girl
would have been allowed to revoke her consent under the more liberal
standards in Australia, it appears unclear how any of this, ipso facto, means
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. In re Adoption of Voss, 550 P.2d 481, 485 (Wyo. 1976) (citing In re Adoption of
Bryant, 189 N.E.2d 593 (Ind. App. 1963)).
57. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (“It is cardinal with us that
the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function
and freedom include preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder.”).
58. See Samuels, supra note 43, at 571.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 516 (discussing In re Baby Girl W., No. 87,291, slip op. (Kan. Ct. App. Apr.
5, 2002)).
62. Id. at 515.
63. Id. at 516–18.
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that Kansas inadequately protected her rights.64 Indeed, much of Professor
Samuels’ article, among other writings on protection of birthparents’ rights
with regard to consent and revocation,65 seems to provide stronger
commentary on best practices by social workers and adoption attorneys,
and less help with regard to reasons why longer revocation periods actually
serve birthparents’ needs.66 What these commentators also fail to address is
that statutory waiting periods before consent can be given are statutory
minimums; there is no requirement that a birthmother must relinquish her
parental rights at that time or at any other time. As is clearly addressed in
the model statute proposed in Part V of this Note, in most states’ laws, in
adoption counseling, and on the face of most consent forms, the
birthmother may take as much time as she wishes to make an adoption plan,
consider other alternatives, or take her baby home to parent.67
Often neglected in the discussion of birthparents’ interests is the
biological father of the child.68 Though rationales for different treatment of
birthfathers include one-night stands, abandonment of the pregnant mother,
and the presumed lesser emotional toll taken on the father in childbirth,
these situations do not always pan out in reality, nor do they necessarily
warrant lesser consideration for the birthfather.69 Nonetheless, distinctions
are often made between birthfathers and birthmothers in statutory consent
requirements.70 Sadly, all that is often required of the birthfather is his
signature.71
But frequently the birthfather cannot be found. Adoption agencies
and attorneys generally do all that they can to locate a missing birthfather,
as most courts require his signature or a showing that his consent cannot be
64. See generally id. (describing the facts of and analyzing In re Baby Girl W., No.
87,291, slip op).
65. See, e.g., Origins Canada, The Rights of Birth Mothers Should Be Protected, in
ADOPTION: OPPOSING VIEWPOINTS 59, 60 (Mary E. Williams ed. 2006) (“The adoption
‘counselors’ like to say ‘It’s your choice’, [sic] all the while making it seem as if you have
no other real options. They have lots of training in ‘counseling’ expectant mothers and
grandparents-to-be so they can get more babies for customers. Do mothers (and fathers)
really ‘choose’ adoption?”); see also Heather Lowe, The Rights of Birth Mothers Must Be
Protected, in ADOPTION: OPPOSING VIEWPOINTS 45, 46–47, 51 (Roman Espejo ed. 2002)
(“But adoption as it is practiced today is a disgrace. It’s become an industry geared not
toward ‘the best interests of the child’ (itself a worn out catchphrase with little real meaning)
but toward serving people who think they have a God-given right to add a child to their
home.”). Ms. Lowe suggests as one of her reform points that irrevocable consent be
abolished. She posits that a three-month window for decision would be preferable to a
seventy-two-hour window, based primarily on the emotionally charged and overwhelming
atmosphere that a birthmother finds herself in during that initial time after birth.
66. See generally Samuels, supra note 43.
67. See infra APPENDIX B: Proposed Statute §§ 4(e), 6(c).
68. See Jeanne Warren Lindsay, The Rights of Birth Fathers Must Be Protected, in
ADOPTION: OPPOSING VIEWPOINTS 55, 56 (Roman Espejo ed. 2002).
69. Id.
70. See infra APPENDIX A.
71. Lindsay, supra note 68, at 56.
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obtained.72 Putative father registries have been established in twenty-seven
states, with seven more states providing methods of registration through
existing agencies, such as the state health department or department of
children’s services.73 The putative father registry affords a man who
believes he may be the father of a child an opportunity to register his belief
and assert his claim to parenthood.74 It also provides an avenue for the
birthfather to be notified of the initiation and progress of adoption
proceedings.75 Failure to register his claim, lack of involvement with the
mother during pregnancy, and lack of financial or emotional support for the
mother are generally viewed in the same light as abandonment, and may
preclude a birthfather from later asserting a claim.76 Likewise, failure to
notify a registered putative father of a pending adoption will likely be fatal
to the adoption proceeding.77
B. Adoptive Parents’ Interests
What types of people seek to adopt?78 The answer, of course, varies
greatly from situation to situation. Adoptive parents may be a childless
couple suffering from infertility or a single mother or father wanting to
share her or his home, or perhaps a couple with children, with room and
love to spare. Some adopt for humanitarian reasons or because the situation
of a particular orphan comes to their attention. Whatever the reason for
seeking to adopt, there is no question that the demand from adoptive
parents remains high; there is no shortage of people willing to adopt
infants.79
But adoptive families often have many obstacles to overcome.
First, the law favors familial connections stemming from birth, creating
72. Id. at 60–61; see also APPENDIX B §§ 3(a), (b) (requiring “good faith and diligent
effort” and “an affidavit of diligent search”).
73. See APPENDIX A for a listing of which states have established putative father
registries, which states have adopted other methods of registering possible fathers, and
statutes responsible for their creation.
74. J.S.A. v. M.H., 863 N.E.2d 236, 247 (Ill. 2007).
75. Id.
76. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 262 (1983); see also id. at 262 n.18 (“[A] natural
father who has played a substantial role in rearing his child has a greater claim to
constitutional protection than a mere biological parent.”).
77. CHILD WELFARE INFORMATION GATEWAY, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN
SERV., THE RIGHTS OF UNMARRIED FATHERS 3–4 (2010), available at https://www.child
welfare.gov/systemwide/laws_policies/statutes/putative.pdf.
78. Just as the stereotypical crack-addict fifteen-year-old birthmother and marriedand-doesn’t-want-his-wife-to-find out birthfather are largely after-school special promoted
mythologies, the baby-hungry, I-have-more-money-than-I-know-what-to-do-with adoptive
parents only exist in Hollywood (perhaps literally), contrary to Ms. Lowe’s assertion, see
supra note 65.
79. See CHILD WELFARE INFORMATION GATEWAY, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN
SERV., HOW MANY CHILDREN WERE ADOPTED IN 2007 AND 2008? (2011), available at
https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubs/adopted0708.pdf.
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what one author calls a “powerful blood bias” in favor of biological
families, even in cases of older children who live under abuse or neglect at
the hand of a biological parent.80 Second, the law makes privacy of
birthparents a major concern, giving them control over “openness” or
“closedness” of the adoption,81 while adoptive parents are expected to forgo
any privacy in the process: “By contrast to the protections accorded
biogenetic parents, individuals who wish to parent through adoption find
their personal values and most intimate behaviors subject to intense scrutiny
and bureaucratic regulation.”82 Third, uncertainty in the permanence of the
adoption decree and the specter of a returning birthparent seeking reunion
with the child, threatening the family bond that had been formed, drives
adoptive parents to seek a “final, not a temporary expedient.”83
Changes in the laws governing adoption have trended toward
eliminating some of the uncertainty in the initiation of adoption
proceedings, but particularly in states whose laws still allow liberal time
periods for revocation of birthparent consent, much uncertainty still remains
for adoptive parents.84 Some adoptive parents—and sometimes
birthparents—seek the aid of “interim care” families to fill the gap between
consent and possibility of revocation.85 An adoption agency or adoption
attorney will arrange a fostering situation for whatever time period a
birthmother feels that she needs to make a decision to give consent, or in
the case of initiation of interim care initiated by adoptive parents, to avoid
the heartache of having a child in the adoptive family’s home for a period
of time after receiving consent, only to have the child taken away on
revocation.86 And adoptive parents who do take the child into their home
80. Elizabeth Bartholet, Taking Adoption Seriously: Radical Revolution or Modest
Revisionism?, in FAMILIES BY LAW: AN ADOPTION READER 115, supra note 12, at 117.
81. Joan Heifetz Hollinger, Overview of Legal Status of Post-Adoption Contact
Agreements, in FAMILIES BY LAW: AN ADOPTION READER 159, supra note 12, at 159.
82. Naomi R. Cahn & Joan Heifetz Hollinger, Introduction to FAMILIES BY LAW: AN
ADOPTION READER, supra note 12, at 4.
83. Cahn, Perfect Substitutes, supra note 19, at 24.
84. Susan Yates Ely, Natural Parents’ Right to Withdraw Consent to Adoption: How
Far Should the Right Extend?, 31 U. LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 685, 685 (1993) (“[E]ven though
various state statutes and cases in this area reflect an improvement in the consideration of the
child’s well-being, many laws governing revocation of consent are still too uncertain and
weak. If public policy in the United States is to promote the adoption of unwanted children,
weaknesses in the law concerning natural parents’ revocation of consent can only discourage
qualified prospective parents from adopting.”).
85. See, e.g., Interim Care for Infants, BARKER FOUNDATION, www.barkerfoundation.
org/pregnancy-services/interim-infant-care (last visited January 12, 2014); Interim Child
Care, SPENCE-CHAPIN, www.spence-chapin.org/unplanned-pregnancy/a4_interim_child_
care.php (last visited January 12, 2014) (“After your child is born, you may need some
additional time to make a permanent plan.”).
86. Before the reader judges too harshly, realize that the best interests of the child are
most readily served by permanency. A better solution than interim care would be for the
birthmother to take the child home with her for the days or weeks that constitute the
revocation period. If she is truly using that time to “make sure of her decision,” time with the
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during this uncertain period often are reluctant to fully commit too soon,
doing damage to the bonding process between parent and child.87
The law with regard to the initiation of adoption proceedings has
historically viewed adoptive parents—third parties to the parent-child
relation, in the eyes of some—as “strangers without rights.”88 Birthparents
control the process in its initiation: First contact with an adoption
professional, social worker, attorney, or direct contact with a prospective
adoptive family is voluntary, not coerced by any government or private
entity, and susceptible to the birthparent’s decision to walk away at any
time prior to signing consent. But adoptive parents must be accorded some
degree of certainty in the process once an adoption plan has been initiated.
“Otherwise, in every case the adoption process would be subject to
interruption at the whim of the natural parent.”89 Though the Supreme
Court of the United States has recognized that adoptive relationships are the
legal equivalent of biological parent-child relationships, such legal
significance does not attach until an adoption is finalized.90 During the time
between birthparent consent and finalization of the adoption decree,91 the
child is without a legal parent.92 In some jurisdictions, revocation is
possible until the decree is final; in a handful, even after.93
C. The Interests of the Child
Is it not the burden of every actor in an adoption—birthparents,
adoptive parents, the court, society at large—to protect the rights, interests,
and well-being of the weakest and most vulnerable person involved in the
process? Consider the keen insight shown by the dissent in the “Baby
Jessica” case concerning protection of the child in the adoption context:
The superior claim of the child to be heard in this case is
grounded not just in law, but in basic human morality.
Adults . . . make choices in their lives, and society holds
them responsible for their choices. When adults are forced
child would certainly serve those ends more readily. But in most cases, the adoptive family
has custody of the child during that uncertain time. The emotional strain can be unbearable,
and child psychiatrists have long held that a child in infancy feels that strain and is not best
served by either prolonging the strain or by being moved to the care of a temporary
caregiver. See GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 44, at 41–43.
87. Id. at 13–14.
88. Petition of Doe, 638 N.E.2d 181, 190 (Ill. 1994); see also id. at 188.
89. Ely, supra note 84, at 697 (quoting In re Appeal in Yuma County, 682 P.2d 6
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1984)).
90. Smith v. Org. of Foster Families for Equality and Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 844 n.51
(1977).
91. In most jurisdictions, a minimum of six months from the filing of the adoption
petition by the adoptive parents.
92. See GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 44, at 102–03.
93. See APPENDIX A; see also discussion infra Part IV(A).
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to bear the consequences of their choices, however
disastrous, at least their character and personality have
been fully formed, and that character can provide the
foundation for recovery, the will to go on.
The character and personality of a child two and one-half
years old is just beginning to take shape. To visit the
consequences of adult choices upon the child during the
formative years of her life, and to force her to sort out the
competing emotional needs of the [birthparents and
adoptive parents], is unnecessarily harsh and without legal
justification.94
Justice Levin points to the heart of the matter: All of the adults involved in
the adoption process have made choices that have led them to this point.
Their needs, while not inconsequential, should be subservient to those of
the child. The child did not choose her circumstances. She did not choose
her birthparents. She did not choose to be adopted, did not bring an
adoption agency or social worker or attorney into her birthmother’s life.
She did not choose her adoptive parents. She has no window in which to
give consent, or revoke consent, or to follow through with an adoption
decree or not. She had no paper work to fill out, no homestudy to conduct.
The child is ultimately at the mercy of the whims of those to whom she
must entrust her safety and well-being. Does it really matter to the child in
her infancy who cares for her and how care is executed? Commentators and
psychoanalysts disagree: Perhaps a child is better left in a foster care
situation during the first few months of her life while her fate is decided,95
or perhaps these first formative months are crucial in her development and
require the nurture, care, and bonding that only a permanent parent
relationship can provide.96
Court systems in the United States have developed what is
commonly called “the best interests of the child” standard to govern child
custody disputes.97 Much controversy and much confusion about the
application of this standard has commentators wondering if it is not just “a
euphemism for unfettered judicial discretion.”98 The 1851 Massachusetts
adoption statute99 makes no mention of such a standard, rather
concentrating on eligibility for adoption and the legal effects of the
94. In re Clausen, 502 N.W.2d 649, 670–71 (Mich. 1993) (Levin, J., dissenting).
95. Samuels, supra note 43, at 571.
96. GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 44, at 19–20.
97. See generally 2 AM. JUR. 2D Adoption § 131 (2014) (presenting the best interests
standard and the wide range of treatment it endures in the courts).
98. DOUGLAS E. ABRAMS ET AL., CONTEMPORARY FAMILY LAW 675 (West 3rd ed.
2012).
99. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
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adoptive relationship.100 However, a similar statute passed in Pennsylvania
in 1855 voiced a concern for “the welfare of the child” in adoption
consideration.101 Through its development, particularly in the last half of
the twentieth century, the best interests of the child standard has taken
many twists and turns in meaning and application, standing for a
determination of stability and permanency for the child in one instance, and
a weighing of which parent or parents would be “better” for the child, in the
judge’s opinion, in other cases.102 Professor Welt demonstrates:
The phrase, “best interests of the child,” means one thing to
a juvenile judge, another thing to adoptive parents,
something else to natural parents and still something
different to disinterested observers. The tendency is to
apply intuition in deciding that a child would be “better”
with one set of parents than with another, and then to
express this intuitive feeling in terms of the legal standard
of being “in the best interests of the child.”103
Many courts recognize this tendency to substitute the judge’s preferences
for an objective determination of the child’s well-being, and accordingly
rule in favor of a balance between choices made by the various actors and
the appropriateness of the particular outcome.104
Illustrative of the great confusion surrounding this standard is the
classic decision of Painter v. Bannister.105 Painter involved a custody battle
over a seven-year-old boy between his biological father and maternal
grandparents, who had cared for the boy since his mother’s death two years
earlier.106 The contrast between lifestyle could not have been greater.107 The
grandparents were a picture of mid-western stability, providing a nice home
with prospects for education and betterment for their grandson.108 By
contrast, the court described the child’s father as “bohemian,” “agnostic or
atheist,” and “a political liberal.”109 The court began its analysis with the
following assertion: “It is not our prerogative to determine custody upon
our choice of one of two ways of life within normal and proper limits and
we will not do so.”110 But the court acknowledged that a pure choice based
100. Cahn, Perfect Substitutes, supra note 19, at 22–23.
101. Id. at 23.
102. Philip S. Welt, Adoption and the Constitution: Are Adoptive Parents Really
“Strangers Without Rights”?, 1995 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 165, 221 (1995).
103. Id.
104. See, e.g., In re S.N.W., 912 So.2d 368, 373 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005).
105. 140 N.W.2d 152 (Iowa 1966).
106. Id. at 153.
107. Id. at 154.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 154–55.
110. Id. at 154.
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on the court’s preferences would deliver custody to the grandparents, that
the presumption for parental preference had been weakened, and that
security and stability were the ultimate measures by which the decision
should be made.111 Thus, the court overcame blood preference for the
biological father of this child, ruling in favor of custody for the
grandparents, based largely on the relationship developed between the child
and his grandparents, and regardless of an absence of a finding of unfitness
in the father.112
It is not the aim of this Note to determine whether this case was
rightly decided, or even whether the “best interests” standard was rightly
applied. Rather, this case provides a ready illustration of the myriad ways
the standard may be interpreted. Anna Freud, psychoanalyst and co-author
of the celebrated Beyond the Best Interests of the Child,113 commented on
Painter that without actually interviewing the Painters and the Bannisters,
she could not make a determination of whether she would agree with the
court’s ruling or not.114 However, blood relationship would get little
consideration from her, as apparently it did from the trial judge:
The “blood-ties” between parent and child as well as the
alleged paternal and maternal “instincts” are biological
concepts which, only too often, prove vague and unreliable
when transferred to the field of psychology.
Psychologically speaking, the child’s “father” is the adult
man to whom the child attaches a particular,
psychologically distinctive set of feelings. When this type
of emotional tie is disrupted, the child’s feelings suffer.
When such separations occur during phases of
development in which the child is particularly vulnerable,
the whole foundation of his personality may be shaken. The
presence of or the reunion with a biological father to whom
no such ties exist will not recompense the child for the loss
which he has suffered. Conversely, the biological father’s
or mother’s unselfish love for their child is by no means to
be taken for granted. It happens often enough that
biological parents fail in their duty to the child, while other
adults who are less closely related to him, i.e., who have no

111. Id. at 156.
112. Id. at 158.
113. Many references in this Note are attributed to this work, but in its collective form,
a trilogy of works on the same subject, including the original, and published posthumously
with regard to Dr. Freud, as GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 44.
114. ANNA FREUD, Painter v. Bannister: Postscript by a Psychoanalyst, 7 WRITINGS OF
ANNA FREUD 247, 247–55 (1967), quoted in ABRAMS ET AL., supra note 98, at 683–84.

362

BELMONT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 1: 343

“instinctive” basis for their feeling, successfully take over
the parental role.115
It is important to note that state intervention is appropriate only in
two circumstances: (1) where the child’s safety is endangered by the parent
to such a degree that termination of parental rights is necessary to ensure
safety, and (2) where, as in infant adoption, the birthparent has voluntarily
sought to terminate her parental rights through consent to adoption.116 At
the point the intent to terminate rights is manifested, the child is patently
“unwanted” and without a legal parent.117 It is of utmost importance that the
child remain in this state of flux for as short a period of time as is
possible.118 “Adoption, if available, offers to such children the best possible
second chance to form the permanent relationships vital to their
development.”119
IV. CURRENT STATUTES GOVERNING
INFANT ADOPTION IN THE UNITED STATES
A brief survey of adoption laws across the fifty states confirms that
no consensus has yet been reached on how to best reconcile these policy
concerns.120 “The lack of coherence and uniformity in our adoption laws
and practices exposes to needless risks all parties to an adoption, and,
especially, the children who become enmeshed in protracted litigation about
their legal status.”121 Despite efforts of the Uniform Law Commission to
normalize adoption statutes and the Interstate Compact on the Placement of
Children to reconcile their application across state borders, states in their
respective legislative acts place emphasis on different actors and their
interests in varied, sometimes conflicting, and often confusing ways.
Families seeking to adopt across state borders are well-advised to keep
abreast of conflicting laws from state to state, and many feel like they must
become experts in the laws of various states before committing to an
adoption plan outside their home state.122
More narrowly, attempts to navigate the quagmire of laws
pertaining particularly to birthparent consent in infant adoptions and when
115. Id.
116. GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 44, at 101–03.
117. Id. at 102.
118. Id. at 43, 50.
119. Id. at 103.
120. Hollinger, State and Federal Adoption Laws, supra note 12, at 37 (“[S]tate
adoption laws are not and never have been uniform, nor have they been consistently
applied.”).
121. Id.
122. One online magazine has recognized the need for an adoption law clearinghouse
for prospective adoptive families. Adoption and Law, ADOPTIVE FAMILIES, www.adoptive
families.com/adoption_law (last visited Jan. 12, 2014).
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that consent can be revoked can be just as frustrating.123 Attorneys and
adoption agencies must be well-versed in these differences if they are to
practice in multiple jurisdictions. They must also be cognizant of the
likelihood that their clients—both birthparents and adoptive parents—will
be ignorant of the intricacies of consent requirements and revocation
allowances and ready to educate and guide through the process. This is
particularly true when adoptive parents have travelled across state lines to
adopt.
While the importance of understanding the detailed requirements
for voluntary relinquishment in a particular jurisdiction cannot be stressed
enough, it is outside the scope of this writing to examine these in any detail.
Instead, this section will attempt to group states into general categories
based on how liberally or narrowly their statutes treat birthparent consent
and revocation.124 The first category treated will be those jurisdictions that
allow broad leeway for birthparents to withdraw their consent to adoption,
in some cases allowing revocation for any reason or no reason thirty days
after consent is given,125 and in others leaving the possibility of revocation
open even after entry of the final adoption decree.126 The second consists of
those states that have somewhat followed the approach recommended in the
Uniform Adoption Act, providing for a brief revocation period.127 The third
category of states for purposes of this analysis provide a shorter or nonexistent revocation period upon signing and in most cases provide a
relatively brief waiting period after birth before consent can be given.128
Finally, we will look at the approach taken by several states that do not fit
neatly into any of these categories but rather take a hybrid approach
dependent on the circumstances under which consent is given.

123. See APPENDIX A.
124. We recognize that this is not the only possible way to group states for analysis. For
example, an interesting study might be an analysis of states by putative father registry,
discussed supra Part III, and how particular states treat birthfather rights in general. Another
interesting study might be a comparison of judicial versus non-judicial consent, discussed
briefly infra Part IV(D).
125. E.g., 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2711(c)(1) (West, WestlawNext through 2013
Act 104); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-19-10-3 (West, WestlawNext through 2013 First Reg. Sess.
and First Reg. Tech. Sess.).
126. E.g., S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-6-21 (WestlawNext through 2013 Reg. Sess.); R.I.
GEN. LAWS § 15-7-21.1 (Lexis Advance through 2013 Reg. Sess.).
127. E.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-1-112 (Lexis Advance through 2013 Reg. Sess.); GA.
CODE ANN. § 19-8-9 (Lexis Advance through 2013 Reg. Sess.).
128. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.082 (West, WestlawNext through 2013 1st Reg. Sess.);
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-22-109 (Lexis Advance through 2013 Reg. Sess.).
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A. Liberal Construction of Consent and Revocation
Twelve states allow for revocation of consent for thirty days after
signing,129 with seven of these allowing revocation up to and, in some
cases, beyond finalization of the adoption decree.130 While some of these
states require a best interests determination in conjunction with revocation,
some allow unconditional revocation.131 It is important to note that for
purposes of this analysis invalidation of consent based on fraud, duress,
coercion, or other manner of undue influence is not factored in. All
jurisdictions allow for invalidation of consent for a period of time, usually
up to the time of finalization of the adoption decree, but sometimes beyond.
This analysis makes a distinction, as do most courts, between allowances of
revocation of validly executed voluntary consents by birthparents and the
invalidation of a consent induced by fraud or coercion.
This grouping of jurisdictions allows for the least amount of change
from the common law view of birthparent consent to adoption. Adoption
statutes in some of these jurisdictions are construed strictly in favor of
biological parents.132 Longer periods of time for birthparents to make up—
or to change—their minds seems to afford less opportunity for litigation.133
But even some states that adhere to longer revocation periods have moved
the ball away from finalization toward the thirty-day mark relative to
signing consent. Take, for instance, Pennsylvania, whose current statute
allows unconditional revocation up to thirty days after signing.134
Pennsylvania courts recognized, before passage of this statute, that a
birthmother could revoke a valid consent to adoption at any time prior to
the final entry of the decree of adoption.135 As late as 1994, this
construction was still in place.136 In addition, courts in Pennsylvania
liberally construe what constitutes a valid revocation, including in some
instances actions that can be interpreted as revocation.137 However,
129. These include Connecticut, Delaware, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Maryland, New
Hampshire, North Dakota, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and South Dakota. See infra
APPENDIX A.
130. Connecticut, Iowa, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Ohio, Rhode Island, and South
Dakota.
131. See APPENDIX A.
132. E.g., In re B.W., 908 N.E. 2d 586, 592 (Ind. 2009).
133. See Samuels, supra note 43, at 548. Note that litigation is not reduced, only
diverted. In states where revocation is limited or not available, litigation concerning
revocation is reduced, but litigation alleging fraud increases. While states that allow for
liberal revocation of consent seem to hear fewer cases, one reason could be that birthparents
have less incentive to cry fraud when they do not have to.
134. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2711(c)(1) (West, WestlawNext through 2013 Reg.
Sess.).
135. Commw. ex rel. Grimes v. Yack, 433 A.2d 1363, 1377 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1981).
136. In re Adoption of Stickley, 638 A.2d 976, 979 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994).
137. Id. (Father’s refusal to cash reimbursement check for child support payments
construed as revocation of consent).
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Pennsylvania changed its statute in 2006 to the current thirty-day revocation
period.138 While a birthmother is allowed by statute to revoke her consent
for any reason, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania holds to a strict
interpretation of the timing requirements.139
B. States That Have Adopted a Quasi-Uniform Adoption Act Approach
Vermont is the only state to have adopted the Uniform Adoption
Act since it was drafted in 1994.140 And Vermont acted very quickly by
adopting the Act in 1996.141 Interestingly, though, one area where
Vermont’s law deviates significantly from the Uniform Act is in the timing
of consent and revocation with regard to infant adoption.142 Though no state
has adopted the Uniform Act’s suggested revocation period of eight days,
seven states have adopted revocation periods ranging between seven and
ten days.143 For instance, in Georgia, consent can be revoked for any reason
138. In re Adoption of J.A.S., 939 A.2d 403, 406 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007).
139. Id. at 408. In In re Adoption of J.A.S., the trial court had held the birthmother’s
consent invalid ab initio because it failed to denote the marital status of the birthmother.
However, the Superior Court held that the timeliness of the revocation, which was the first
challenge to the original consent’s validity, must be determined before reaching the issue of
technical validity, because the statute specified a thirty-day revocation period but did not
“explicitly state it is subject to strict construction.” Id. The birthmother’s attempted
revocation 100 days after signing consent was not timely, and therefore not an effective
challenge to the consent’s validity. Id. at 409. Presumably, had the birthmother delivered her
petition within the thirty-day window, she would not have had to argue invalidity at all.
140. UNIF. ADOPTION ACT, 9 U.L.A. 11 (Supp. 2013).
141. Id.; 1996 Vt. Acts & Resolves 262.
142. Compare VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15A, § 2-404(a) with UNIF. ADOPTION ACT § 2-404, 9
U.L.A. 53.
Time and Prerequisites for Execution of Consent or Relinquishment.
(a) A parent whose consent to the adoption of a minor is required by
section 2-401 of this title may not execute a consent or a relinquishment
sooner than 36 hours after the minor is born. A parent who executes a
consent or relinquishment may revoke the consent or relinquishment
within 21 days after the consent or relinquishment is executed by filing a
written notice in the court in which the consent was executed.
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15A, § 2-404 (West, WestlawNext through 2013 Sess.).
Time and Prerequisites for Execution of Consent or Relinquishment.
(a) A parent whose consent to the adoption of a minor is required by
Section 2-401 may execute a consent or a relinquishment only after the
minor is born. A parent who executes a consent or relinquishment may
revoke the consent or relinquishment within 192 hours after the birth of
the minor.
UNIF. ADOPTION ACT § 2-404.
143. These include Alaska, Arkansas, Georgia, Minnesota, North Carolina, Tennessee,
and Virginia. See infra APPENDIX A.
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at all within ten days of execution.144 Georgia courts will not allow
revocation after the ten-day period has expired, and have expressly denied
requests to extend the period for “good and sufficient cause.”145
But courts will consider a petition to set aside a surrender as invalid
even after the revocation period has run, on grounds of fraud or duress in
inducing the birthparent to sign consent.146 Duress, for purposes of
invalidating a consent to adoption, is defined as it is in all contract cases.147
For instance, in one recent Georgia case, the Court of Appeals found that a
state children’s services caseworker’s “suggestion” that it would be in the
mother’s best interest to surrender her parental rights was sufficient grounds
to set aside the mother’s consent, even though the statutory ten-day
revocation period had elapsed.148 But financial or emotional pressure,
unless caused by an adverse party, particularly the other person seeking to
enter the contract or someone acting on their behalf, does not constitute
duress.149 Nor does a self-inflicted crisis, no matter how extreme or to what
extent internal influences may have affected the birthmother’s judgment.150
C. Narrow Construction of Consent and Revocation
An increasing trend has been seen over the past decade of states
reducing the statutory timeframe for both consent and revocation.151 While
there is no clear majority rule, the largest plurality of states—eighteen at the
time of this writing—falls into this category.152 These consist of states that
have shorter mandatory waiting periods of twelve to ninety-six hours for

144. Hicks v. Stargel, 487 S.E.2d 428, 429 (Ct. App. Ga. 1997).
145. Id.
146. This is true in all fifty states, though the time frame varies for how long a
birthparent has to bring a challenge on these grounds.
147. Mabou v. Eller, 502 S.E.2d 760, 762 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998) (“Duress is considered
as a species of fraud in which compulsion in some form takes the place of deception in
accomplishing an injury. . . . Duress which will avoid a contract must consist of threats of
bodily or other harm, or other means amounting to coercion, or tending to coerce the will of
another, and actually inducing him to do an act contrary to his free will.”) (quoting Tidwell
v. Critz, 282 S.E.2d 104, 107 (Ga. 1981) (citations omitted)).
148. In re K.W., 662 S.E.2d 255, 257 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008).
149. Mabou, 502 S.E.2d at 762.
150. Schumacher v. Sexton, 455 S.E.2d 348, 349 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995) overruled by In
Interest of B.G.D., 479 S.E.2d 439 (Ct. App. Ga. 1996). The court in B.G.D. overruled
Schumacher on grounds of “good and sufficient cause.” Despite the fact that the mother in
Schumacher was addicted to cocaine and claimed to be under the influence when signing
consent papers, the trial court found, and the appellate court affirmed, that “she knowingly
and voluntarily relinquished” her parental rights. Schumacher, 466 S.E.2d at 350.
151. Samuels, supra note 43, at 545.
152. Arizona, Colorado, Florida, Illinois, Kansas, Maine, Louisiana, Massachusetts,
Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, South Carolina, Utah,
Washington, and Wyoming.
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consent153 and do not allow any revocation after consent is given.154 And
irrevocable means irrevocable. Though consent may be invalidated in these
states by a showing of inducement by fraud or duress,155 consent will be
upheld in cases bordering on such a finding. Mistake is not a sufficient
ground once the revocation period has passed,156 nor is a birthparent’s
status as a minor.157 Even potentially misleading statements by a social
worker may be cured by the social worker reading and explaining the
consent form to the birthparent.158 One method employed by many
jurisdictions for assuring the voluntariness of consent is the requirement of
pre-consent interviews with birthparents by an adoption professional; a
failure to conduct such an interview is prima facie evidence of
inducement.159
D. Other Approaches
The remaining thirteen states are either some type of hybrid
between the categories above, take no stance on waiting times for consent
or revocation periods (or both), simply do not neatly fit into one of these
categories, or are so ambiguous or equivocal that the scope of this Note
does not allow us to delve into their respective statutes. However, two other
distinct categories arise that are worth mentioning, if only in passing, that
distinguish based on where consent is given or by whom consent is taken.
The first of these consists of two states that distinguish between
consents given in the courtroom and those given outside the courtroom.
New York law does not specify a waiting period after which consent can be
given.160 But judicial consent, executed in a courtroom in front of a judge,
is irrevocable upon execution, while non-judicial consent can be revoked
within forty-five days.161 In Oklahoma, consent can be given any time after

153. With the exception of Louisiana, which makes a distinction between agency
adoptions and private adoptions, requiring a five-day waiting period for private adoptions.
See infra APPENDIX A.
154. With the exceptions of Missouri and Washington, which require approval of
consent by a court. Consent is technically not valid until court approval is given. Approval is
expedited, however, with Missouri requiring approval within three days of signing or the
consent becomes irrevocable, and Washington requiring a forty-eight hour lapse between
birth and approval or signing and approval. See infra APPENDIX A.
155. F.R. v. Adoption of Baby Boy Born November 2, 2010, No. 1D12-16, 2012 WL
1813520 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. May 21, 2012) (finding that adoption agency’s failure to
translate documents into a language the birthmother could understand invalidated consent).
156. J.K. ex rel. D.K. v. M.K., 5 P.3d 782, 791 (Wyo. 2000) (finding that birthfather’s
belief that his consent was not final was unavailing).
157. Id. at 792.
158. Id.
159. J.S. v. S.A., 912 So. 2d 650, 658 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005).
160. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 111 (WestlawNext through 2013 Ch. 340).
161. Id.
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the child is born.162 Judicial consent is likewise irrevocable, and nonjudicial consent can be revoked within fifteen days.163
The other category consists of two states that distinguish between
agency and non-agency adoptions in their consent and revocation laws.
California allows consent to be given any time after birth in the case of an
agency adoption,164 with consent revocable only by mutual consent.165 But
in the case of direct placement, California allows consent when the
birthmother is discharged from the hospital,166 with a thirty-day revocation
period.167 Texas makes a similar distinction. Birthmother consent in Texas
may be given forty-eight hours after the birth of the child.168 Consent given
to a state-licensed agency is irrevocable upon execution.169 All other
consents are revocable for eleven days, unless the consent expressly
provides otherwise, but such a contractual revocation period may not
exceed sixty days.170
V. PROPOSAL: WHICH STATUTORY SCHEME IS
“LEAST DETRIMENTAL” TO THE CHILD’S INTERESTS?
The adoption statute proposed in APPENDIX B fits squarely within
the narrow construction category described in Part IV(C) of this Note. The
statute provides procedural and notice safeguards for birthparents.171 It also
mandates pre-consent counseling for the protection of the birthparents172 in
addition to a recitation of birthparents’ rights and an explanation of the
finality of relinquishment on the face of the consent form to be signed.173 In
support of finality of the adoption placement, an interest shared by all three
members of the adoption triad, the minimum required delay in allowance of
consent by the birthmother has been kept brief, allowing for relinquishment
when seventy-two hours have elapsed after the birth of the child, or upon
the release of the birthmother from the hospital, whichever is earlier.174 The
statute also makes such consent by the birthmother, as well as consent by

23).

162. OKLA. ANN. STAT. tit. 10, § 7503-2.2 (WestlawNext through 54th Legis. Sess. Ch.

163. Id.
164. CAL. FAM. CODE § 8700 (West, WestlawNext through 2013 Reg. Sess.).
165. Id. (stating that in an agency adoption, consent can only be revoked by mutual
consent of both the birthparent and adoptive parent, but if the adoptive parent to whom
consent was originally given fails to finalize the adoption, consent is then revocable for
thirty days).
166. CAL. FAM. CODE § 8801.3 (West, WestlawNext through 2013 Reg. Sess.).
167. CAL. FAM. CODE § 8814.5 (West, WestlawNext through 2013 Reg. Sess.).
168. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.103 (West, WestlawNext through 2013 Reg. Sess.).
169. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.106 (WestlawNext).
170. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.103 (WestlawNext).
171. See infra APPENDIX B §§ 1(c), 3(a)–(b), 4, 5.
172. Id.§ 6.
173. Id. § 4.
174. Id. § 4(b).
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the birthfather, irrevocable upon signing.175 This proposal is consistent with
a trend seen in recent years toward expeditious pursuit of finality in the
initiation of adoption proceedings,176 is supported by the arguments set
forth in this Note, and is desirable as a model for uniformity as states seek
coherence in adoption regulation.
This Part will set forth the proposed statute section by section, with
each section followed by brief commentary.177 Finally, argument in support
of key aspects of the statute, particularly with regard to policy concerns in
support of shorter waiting periods for consent and the abolishment of
revocation periods, will follow.
A. Proposed Statute
Section 1.
(1) Consent.
(a) Consent to an adoption or an affidavit of
nonpaternity shall be executed as follows:
1. If by an agency, by affidavit from its
authorized representative.
2. If by any other person, in the presence
of the court or by affidavit
acknowledged before a notary public
and in the presence of two witnesses.
3. If by a court, by an appropriate order or
certificate of the court.
(b) A minor parent has the power to consent to the
adoption of his or her child and has the power
to relinquish his or her control or custody of
the child to an adoption entity. Such consent or
relinquishment is valid and has the same force
and effect as a consent or relinquishment
executed by an adult parent. A minor parent,
having executed a consent or relinquishment,
may not revoke that consent upon reaching the
age of majority or otherwise becoming
emancipated.
(c) A consent or an affidavit of nonpaternity
executed by a minor parent who is 14 years of
175. Id. §§ 4(a), (b), (e).
176. Samuels, supra note 43, at 545.
177. The text of the entire proposed statute is included in APPENDIX B, infra, for the
reader’s convenience.
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age or younger must be witnessed by a parent,
legal guardian, or court-appointed guardian ad
litem.
(d) The notice and consent provisions of this
chapter as they relate to the father of a child do
not apply in cases in which the child is
conceived as a result of a violation of the
criminal laws of this or another state or
country, including, but not limited to, sexual
battery, unlawful sexual activity with certain
minors, lewd acts perpetrated upon a minor, or
incest.
COMMENTS
Section (1)(a) provides who may assist a birthparent in executing
consent and in what form consent must come, always in writing, under each
possible circumstance.178 For the purpose of consent to adoption, a minor
birthparent is treated the same as an adult, and his or her consent cannot be
revoked based on age, nor will it become revocable upon the birthparent
reaching majority.179 However, if the birthparent is fourteen years of age or
less, a parent, legal guardian, or court-appointed guardian ad litem must
witness the execution of consent.180 Section (1)(d) provides that a
birthfather who conceives a child as the result of a sex crime does not enjoy
the same rights to notice and consent.181
Section 2.
(2) A consent that does not name or otherwise identify the
adopting parent is valid if the consent contains a
statement by the person consenting that the consent was
voluntarily executed and that identification of the
adopting parent is not required for granting the consent.
COMMENTS
Section (2) provides that it is not necessary to name the adoptive
parent or parents on the written consent, but the birthparent must
acknowledge in writing that the consent was voluntary and that the adoptive
parent was purposely not identified.182

178. See infra APPENDIX B § 1(a).
179. Id. § 1(b).
180. Id. § 1(c).
181. Id. § 1(d).
182. See infra APPENDIX B § 2.
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Section 3.
(3) Availability of Persons Required to Give Consent.
(a) A good faith and diligent effort must be made to
have each parent whose identity is known and
whose consent is required interviewed by a
representative of the adoption entity before the
consent is executed. A summary of each
interview, or a statement that the parent is
unidentified, unlocated, or unwilling or
unavailable to be interviewed, must be filed
with the petition to terminate parental rights
pending adoption. The interview may be
excused by the court for good cause.
(b) If any person who is required to consent is
unavailable because the person cannot be
located, an affidavit of diligent search shall be
filed.
(c) If any person who is required to consent is
unavailable because the person is deceased, the
petition to terminate parental rights pending
adoption must be accompanied by a certified
copy of the death certificate.
COMMENTS
Every effort must be made to identify and get the consent of both
birthparents.183 Pre-consent interviews184 are required by statute, and the
adoption professional is required to write a summary of the interview or a
statement of why a birthparent was unavailable to be interviewed.185 Under
the proposed statute, if a birthparent cannot be located, the adoption
professional must file “an affidavit of diligent search” or, in the case of
death of a birthparent, a certified copy of the death certificate.186
Section 4.
(4) Execution Procedure, Timing, and Irrevocability.
(a) An affidavit of nonpaternity may be executed
before the birth of the child; however, the
183. Id. § 3(a).
184. See infra notes 202–205 and accompanying text (discussing Pre-Consent
Counseling).
185. Infra APPENDIX B § 3(a).
186. Id. §§ 3(b), (c).
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consent to an adoption may not be executed
before the birth of the child except in a
preplanned adoption. An affidavit of
nonpaternity may be set aside only if the court
finds that the affidavit was obtained by fraud or
duress.
(b) A consent to the adoption of a child who is to be
placed for adoption may be executed by the
birthmother 72 hours after the child’s birth or
the day the birthmother is notified in writing,
either on her patient chart or in release
paperwork, that she is fit to be released from
the licensed hospital or birth center, whichever
is earlier. A consent by the birthfather may be
executed at any time. The consent is valid upon
execution and may be withdrawn only if the
court finds that it was obtained by fraud or
duress.
(c) If the consent of one parent is set aside in
accordance with this chapter, any other
consents executed by the other parent or a third
party whose consent is required for the
adoption of the child may not be used by the
parent whose consent was set aside to terminate
or diminish the rights of the other parent or
third party whose consent was required for the
adoption of the child.
(d) The consent to adoption or the affidavit of
nonpaternity must be signed in the presence of
two witnesses and be acknowledged before a
notary public who is not signing as one of the
witnesses. The notary public must legibly note
on the consent or the affidavit the date and time
of execution. The witnesses’ names must be
typed or printed underneath their signatures.
The witnesses’ home or business addresses
must be included. The person who signs the
consent or the affidavit has the right to have at
least one of the witnesses be an individual who
does not have an employment, professional, or
personal relationship with the adoption entity or
the prospective adoptive parents. The adoption
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entity must give reasonable advance notice to
the person signing the consent or affidavit of
the right to select a witness of his or her own
choosing. The person who signs the consent or
affidavit must acknowledge in writing on the
consent or affidavit that such notice was given
and indicate the witness, if any, who was
selected by the person signing the consent or
affidavit. The adoption entity must include its
name, address, and telephone number on the
consent to adoption or affidavit of nonpaternity.
(e) A consent to adoption being executed by the
birthparent must be in at least 12-point
boldfaced type and shall contain the following
recitation of rights:
CONSENT TO ADOPTION
You have the right to select at least one person who does
not have an employment, professional, or personal
relationship with the adoption entity or the prospective
adoptive parents to be present when this affidavit is
executed and to sign it as a witness. You must acknowledge
on this form that you were notified of this right and you
must indicate the witness or witnesses you selected, if any.
You do not have to sign this consent form. You may do any
of the following instead of signing this consent or before
signing this consent:
1. Consult with an attorney;
2. Hold, care for, and feed the child unless otherwise
legally prohibited;
3. Spend time alone with the child;
4. Place the child in foster care or with any friend or
family member you choose who is willing to care
for the child;
5. Take the child home unless otherwise legally
prohibited; and,
6. Find out about the community resources that are
available to you if you do not go through with the
adoption.
If you do sign this consent, you are giving up all rights to
your child. Your consent is valid, binding, and irrevocable
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the moment you sign it except under specific legal
circumstances. If you are giving up your rights to a
newborn child who is to be immediately placed for adoption
upon the child’s release from a licensed hospital or birth
center following birth, a waiting period will be imposed
upon the birthmother before she may sign the consent for
adoption. A birthmother must wait 72 hours from the time
of birth, or until the day the birthmother has been notified in
writing, either on her patient chart or in release papers, that
she is fit to be released from a licensed hospital or birth
center, whichever is sooner, before the consent for adoption
may be executed. The birthfather may execute consent at
any time. Once you have signed the consent, it is valid,
binding, and irrevocable and cannot be invalidated unless a
court finds that it was obtained by fraud or duress.
If you believe that your consent was obtained by fraud or
duress and you wish to invalidate that consent, you must:
1. Notify the adoption entity, by writing a letter,
that you wish to withdraw your consent; and
2. Prove in court that the consent was obtained by
fraud or duress.
COMMENTS
Section (4) contains the timing provisions which have been the
central focus of this Note.187 A birthmother may not give consent until
seventy-two hours after the birth of the child.188 However, if the
birthmother is released from the hospital before this time expires, she may
give consent on the day of her release from the hospital.189 The birthfather
may give his consent at any time, even before the birth of the child,
provided that there is an adoption plan in place.190 This is intended to avoid
situations where a birthfather attempts to relinquish his rights to avoid
parenting and support obligations, which he is not allowed to do.191 It is
also intended to provide certainty in the proceedings by ensuring that a
birthfather’s consent or nonpaternity affidavit may be secured at any time
that the adoption professional or birthmother is able to locate him.
Consent by either parent is irrevocable upon execution.192 The only
ground for invalidating or setting aside birthparent consent is on a court

187. Id. § 4(b).
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id. § 4(a).
191. See, e.g., In re Ryan B., 686 S.E.2d 601, 605 (W. Va. 2009).
192. See infra APPENDIX B §§ 4(a), (b).
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finding “that it was obtained by fraud or duress.”193 In the event that the
consent of one birthparent is invalidated, the valid consent of the other
birthparent may not be used against him or her by the birthparent who gave
invalid consent or by a third party.194
Sections (4)(d), (4)(e), and (5) contain procedural safeguards to
reduce the possibility of fraud or coercion. For example, a birthparent
consent must be executed in front of at least two witnesses and notarized,
and the notary may not act as one of the witnesses.195 The birthparent may
choose at least one of the witnesses,196 and must be informed in writing on
the consent form itself of this right.197 Section (4)(d) provides what
information must be included about the witnesses and the adoption agency
on the consent itself.198 Section (4)(e) provides the text of the consent form,
along with typeface restrictions.199 The form contains written notice to the
birthparent of pertinent provisions of the statute, along with a procedure to
follow if the birthparent believes he or she is being defrauded, and the
following options:
You do not have to sign this consent form. You may do any
of the following instead of signing this consent or before
signing this consent:
1. Consult with an attorney;
2. Hold, care for, and feed the child unless
otherwise legally prohibited;
3. Spend time alone with the child;
4. Place the child in foster care or with any friend
or family member you choose who is willing to
care for the child;
5. Take the child home unless otherwise legally
prohibited; and,
6. Find out about the community resources that are
available to you if you do not go through with
the adoption.
If you do sign this consent, you are giving up all rights to
your child. Your consent is valid, binding, and irrevocable
the moment you sign it except under specific legal
circumstances.200

193. Id.
194. Id. § 4(c).
195. Id. § 4(d).
196. Id.
197. Id. § 4(e).
198. Id. § 4(d).
199. Id. § 4(e).
200. Id.
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Section 5.
(5) A copy or duplicate original of each consent signed in
an action for termination of parental rights pending
adoption must be provided to the person who executed
the consent to adoption. The copy must be hand
delivered, with a written acknowledgment of receipt
signed by the person whose consent is required at the
time of execution. If a copy of a consent cannot be
provided as required in this subsection, the adoption
entity must execute an affidavit stating why the copy of
the consent was not delivered. The original consent and
acknowledgment of receipt, or an affidavit stating why
the copy of the consent was not delivered, must be filed
with the petition for termination of parental rights
pending adoption.
COMMENTS
Section (5) provides that the birthparent must be given a copy of
the signed consent at the time of execution, or the adoption agency must
provide to the court a written explanation in case a copy could not be
provided.201
Section 6.
(6) Counseling.
(a) Counseling of the birthmother is required in
department, agency, and direct parental
placement adoptions. If any other parent is
involved in an adoptive placement, counseling
of that parent is encouraged.
(b) Counseling must be performed by a person
employed by the department or by a staff
person of a licensed child-placing agency
designated to provide this type of counseling.
Unless the counseling requirement is waived
for good cause by a court, a minimum of 3
hours of counseling must be completed prior to
execution of a relinquishment of parental rights
and consent to adopt. A relinquishment and
consent to adopt executed prior to completion
of required counseling is void.

201. Id. § 5.
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(c) During counseling, the counselor shall offer an
explanation of:
1. adoption procedures and options that are
available to a parent through the
department or licensed child-placing
agencies;
2. adoption procedures and options that are
available to a parent through direct
parental
placement
adoptions,
including the right to an attorney and
that legal expenses are an allowable
expense that may be paid by a
prospective adoptive parent;
3. the alternative of parenting rather than
relinquishing the child for adoption;
4. the resources that are available to
provide assistance or support for the
parent and the child if the parent
chooses not to relinquish the child;
5. the legal and personal effect and impact
of terminating parental rights and of
adoption;
6. the
options
for
contact
and
communication between the birth
family and the adoptive family;
7. postadoptive issues, including grief and
loss, and the existence of a
postadoptive counseling and support
program;
8. the fact that the adoptee may be provided
with a copy of the original birth
certificate upon request after reaching
18 years of age, unless the birth parent
has specifically requested in writing
that the vital statistics bureau withhold
release of the original birth certificate.
(d) The counselor shall prepare a written report
containing a description of the topics covered
and the number of hours of counseling. The
report must specifically include the counselor’s
opinion of whether or not the parent understood
all of the issues and was capable of informed
consent. The report must, on request, be
released to the person counseled, to the
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department, to an agency, or with the consent
of the person counseled, to an attorney for the
prospective adoptive parents.
COMMENTS
At least three hours of pre-consent counseling for the birthmother
are required in every adoption, and counseling is encouraged, but not
required, for the birthfather.202 Who may counsel a birthparent203 and a list
of issues that must be addressed are outlined in the statute, including
procedural information, the legal significance of terminating parental rights,
the emotional significance of terminating a parental relationship, the option
of open adoption, the option to walk away from the adoption plan, and a list
of available resources in case the birthmother decides to parent her child.204
Finally, the counselor must provide to the court a written report outlining
the counseling given.205
B. Rationale
The crucial provisions in this proposal are those that deal with the
timing of consent and the disallowance of revocation. This Note has
established in Part III why an abbreviated period of uncertainty is in the
best interests of the child.206 The desires of the adoptive family are likewise
served by reducing this window of time.207 But what needs to be
emphasized is that brevity in delay of finality in the child’s status also
serves birthparents well. While proponents of longer revocation periods
believe that putting off the birthparents’ decision serves the birthparents’
interests, the opposite is almost certainly the case. Advocates for
birthparents’ rights claim that hours or days after the birth of a child is too
emotional a time to be making such life-changing decisions.208 Conceding
that the emotions surrounding the birth of a child make it difficult to make a
non-emotional decision, it is still not readily apparent that the situation
improves dramatically with the passage of a little time. If a ten-day
revocation period is better than a three-day revocation period for a
birthmother’s peace of mind, then certainly by the same logic a twenty-oneday period, or a thirty-day period, or a ninety-day period would be vastly
superior. But the longer the statutory revocation period, the greater the
threat to the stability, permanence, and continuity of the adoptive family
unit. A degree of uncertainty and anxiety will be present in the adoptive
202. Id. §§ 6(a), (b).
203. Id. § 6(b).
204. Id. § 6(c).
205. Id. § 6(d).
206. GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 44, at 43.
207. Cahn, Family Issue(s), supra note 48, at 271.
208. Samuels, supra note 43, at 545.
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home until the day the family can breathe a collective sigh of relief: The
new baby is finally “one of us.” If a three-day window for the birthmother
to change her mind forces her to make a decision in the midst of a very
trying and emotional time, does a ten-day window really rectify that
situation? And with whom is the child bonding and identifying as mom in
the interim?
It would seem consistent with the interests of both birthparents to
have made a final, rational decision before the emotions of childbirth add to
the confusion in what, in most cases, is already a tough situation.209 This is
true even if the state does not allow for consent to be given until after birth
in the case of the mother, allowing for consent to be given by the father at
any time. Except in the rare case, consent is given willingly and voluntarily.
In cases where fraud or duress is present, no state withholds the right to
challenge consent as being invalid, whether it is subject to revocation or
not.210 Under the proposed approach, counseling and advice are mandated
by statute and paid for by the prospective adoptive parents in an effort to
aid the informed decision of the birthparents. In giving voluntary consent,
the birthparents have presumably already thoughtfully considered their
options. It would be the rare case indeed where the life circumstances that
precipitated a birthmother seeking out an adoption plan, going through nine
months of pregnancy, deciding to relinquish her parental rights and working
with the birthfather to relinquish his parental rights, whatever those
circumstances may be, have changed so drastically in the few days or
weeks after signing consent that revocation is in the birthparents’ interest.
Rather, finality in the process and the birthparents’ interests are better
served when the decision made is as untainted as possible by emotion and
the possibility of putting the decision off until later in an already difficult
situation.211
CONCLUSION
It is the case that, contrary to popular wisdom, no one’s interests
are advanced by prolonging the process of finalization of an adoption plan.
Both sets of parents—those who are connected to the child through biology
and those who may ultimately end up providing the child with a lifetime of
care and a family in which to belong—benefit from the finality,
permanency, and predictability of a firm decision, once a decision is made.
But of foremost importance, as the child’s future hangs in the balance, it is
209. GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 44, at 43.
210. See infra APPENDIX A.
211. For example, according to the Florida Legislature, “[a]n unmarried mother faced
with the responsibility of making crucial decisions about the future of a newborn child is
entitled to privacy, has the right to make timely and appropriate decisions regarding her
future and the future of the child, and is entitled to assurance regarding an adoptive
placement.” FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.022 (1)(b) (West, WestlawNext through 2013 First Reg.
Sess.) (emphasis added).
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to his or her needs that we must first attend. And the child’s interests are
clearly better served by finality, regardless of which family she ends up
calling her own.
Viewed in this light, there is clearly no room for revocation periods
in the adoption process. Relinquishment of parental rights should not be
entered into lightly. Birthparents should take as much time as they need to
make such a momentous decision. Statutory minimum waiting periods
before consent can be given after birth help to ensure that birthparents are
afforded an opportunity to reflect, even after the pre-birth decision has been
made, and to understand that no one is expecting them to agree to an
adoption plan against their will. But this period must also be kept to a
minimum in the child’s interest, to avoid foster care and needless ambiguity
in the child’s status. Adoptive parents, social workers, and adoption
professionals must be patient and understanding, allowing birthparents the
breathing room they need to make a final decision. But in the end, the child
will need someone to care for him or her, and the final decision must be
final.

ALA. CODE §§ 2610A-7 to -14
(WestlawNext
through 2013 Reg.
Sess.).

ALASKA STAT.
§§ 25.23.040–.090
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ARIZ. REV. STAT.
§§ 8-106(A) to -107
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and Special Sess.).
ARK. CODE ANN.
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Alabama

Alaska

No

Yes

Seventy-two
hours after birth

Any time after
birth

(1) Within ten days after signing or birth, whichever is later, but
(2) irrevocable after entry of adoption decree

Irrevocable unless obtained by fraud, duress, or undue influence

(1) Within five days after birth or after signing consent,
whichever is later, (2) within fourteen days if court finds grounds
reasonable and within best interests of the child, or (3) until final
decree upon finding of fraud, duress, mistake, or undue influence
(after one year from final decree, consent may not be challenged
on any ground unless the child has been kidnapped)
(1) Within ten days after consent is given, (2) before adoption
decree is entered if court finds in best interests of the child, but
(3) irrevocable after entry of adoption decree

Yes

Yes

When can consent be revoked?

Is consent
revocable?

Any time after
birth

When can
consent be
given?
Any time

Yes

Yes

Filed with
state
registrar

Putative
father
registry?
Yes
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*
For the purposes of this table, invalidation of consent by a finding of fraud, duress, misrepresentation, coercion, mistake, or undue influence is not
considered voluntary withdrawal, though treatment of such situations in statutory language varies.
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Statute

State
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CAL. FAM. CODE
§§ 8602–8606,
8801.3, 8700,
8814.5
(WestlawNext
through 2013 Reg.
Sess.).
COLO. REV. STAT.
§§ 19-5-103 to -105,
-203, 19-3-604
(Lexis Advance
through 2013 Reg.
Sess.).
CONN. GEN. STAT.
§§ 45a-715 to -719
(West,
WestlawNext
through 2013 Reg.
Sess.).
DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
13 §§ 907–909,
1103(a), 1106(c)
(Lexis Advance
through 2013 Reg.
Sess.).

California

Delaware

Connecticut

Colorado

Statute

State

Yes

(1) Mother: After
birth; (2) Father:
Any time

Only if, within ninety days of relinquishment order, fraud or
duress can be established by clear and convincing evidence

No

Must file petition with court within 60 days of filing adoption
petition; court will make determination within 30 days

(1) Only by motion, court will make best interests of the child
determination, but (2) irrevocable after final adoption decree
entered

(1) Direct placement: thirty days after consent is given;
(2) Agency: Only by mutual consent, unless placement is not
finalized with specified adoptive parent, then birthparent has 30
days

Yes

Yes

When can consent be revoked?

Is consent
revocable?

Forty-eight hours
after birth

When can
consent be
given?
(1) Direct
placement: When
birthmother is
discharged from
the hospital;
(2) Agency: Any
time after birth
Any time after
birth

Yes

Filed with
court of
probate

No

Putative
father
registry?
Filed with
Dept. of
Children’s
Services
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FLA. STAT. ANN.
§§ 63.062–.064,
.082 (West,
WestlawNext
through 2013 Reg.
Sess.).

GA. CODE ANN.
§§ 19-8-4 to -7, -9
(Lexis Advance
through 2013 Reg.
Sess.).
HAW. REV. STAT.
§§ 578-2, 571-61
(West,
WestlawNext
through 2013 Reg.
Sess.).
IDAHO CODE ANN.
§§ 16-1504, -1506,
-1515 (Lexis
Advance through
2013 Reg. Sess.).

Florida

Georgia

Idaho

Hawaii

Statute

State

Yes

Not addressed

Within ten days after signing

Yes

Not addressed; if birthparent revokes consent, must reimburse
adoptive parents for expenses

Judgment may not be entered until after birth, and birthparents
must file a reaffirmation of surrender not less than ten days prior
to the proposal for entry of judgment; cannot be withdrawn after
placement, unless the court finds in the best interests of the child

(1) Only on finding of fraud or duress, but (2) if child is over six
months old at adoption, subject to a three-day revocation period
or any time prior to the placement, whichever is later

No (Yes if
child older
than six
months)

No, but
equivocal

When can consent be revoked?

Is consent
revocable?

Any time after
sixth month of
pregnancy

When can
consent be
given?
(1) Mother:
Forty-eight hours
after birth or
upon release from
the hospital,
whichever is
earlier; (2)
Father: Any time
after birth
Any time after
birth

Yes

Forms
provided

Yes

Putative
father
registry?
Yes
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750 ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. 50/8–
/12.1 (West,
WestlawNext
through 2013 Reg.
Sess.).
IND. CODE ANN.
§§ 31-19-9-1 to -3
(West,
WestlawNext
through 2013 Reg.
Sess.).
IOWA CODE ANN.
§§ 600.7, 600A.4
(West,
WestlawNext
through 2013 Reg.
Sess.).
KAN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 59-2114 to
-2115, -2129, -2136
(West,
WestlawNext
through 2013 Reg.
Sess.).

Illinois

Kansas

Iowa

Indiana

Statute

State

When can consent be revoked?

(1) Only on finding of fraud or duress, but (2) not at all after
twelve months from date of consent

(1) Birthfather who consents before birth of the child cannot
revoke consent, but (2) no later than thirty days after consent is
signed, if court finds best interests of the child

(1) Within ninety-six hours of signing consent, or (2) prior to
issuance of adoption decree upon a showing by clear and
convincing evidence that good cause exists for revocation (e.g.,
fraud, coercion, or material misrepresentation, or finding of best
interests of the child)
Only by clear and convincing evidence that consent was not
freely and voluntarily given

Is consent
revocable?
No

Yes (No by
father
signed
before
birth)
Yes

No

(1) Mother: Any
time after birth;
(2) Father: Any
time

Seventy-two
hours after birth

Twelve hours
after birth; not
more than six
months prior to
filing of petition
for adoption

When can
consent be
given?
(1) Mother:
Seventy-two
hours after birth;
(2) Father: Any
time

No

Yes

Yes

Putative
father
registry?
Yes
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Maryland

Maine

ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 18-A,
§§ 9-202, -302
(West,
WestlawNext to
2013 First Reg. and
First Special Sess.).
MD. CODE ANN.,
FAM. LAW §§ 5-338
to -341, 5-3B-21 to
-26, 5-351 (West,
WestlawNext
through 2013 Reg.
Sess.).

KY. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 199.500–
.502, 625.040
(West,
WestlawNext
through 2013 Reg.
Sess.).
LA. CHILD. CODE
ANN art. 1113,
1120–1123, 1193
(WestlawNext
through 2013 Legis.
Sess.).

Kentucky

Louisiana

Statute

State

Any time after
birth

(1) Agency
adoption: Three
days after birth;
(2) Private
adoption: Five
days after birth;
(3) Father: Any
time
Any time after
birth

When can
consent be
given?
Seventy-two
hours after birth

Only upon proof of duress or fraud, except in the case of a father
signing consent before the fifth day after birth, in which case
consent becomes irrevocable five days after birth

Consent is final only for the adoption consented to; if that
petition is withdrawn, necessary to hold review; consent not valid
until three days after signing

No

No

Within thirty days of signing consent or thirty days after adoption
petition is filed, whichever is later

Within twenty days after placement approval or execution of
consent, whichever is later

Yes

Yes

When can consent be revoked?

Is consent
revocable?

No

No

Yes

Putative
father
registry?
Yes
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MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 210 §§ 2
to 2B, 3 (Lexis
Advance through
2013 Legis. Sess.
Act 175).
MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. §§ 710.29–.51
(West,
WestlawNext
through 2013 Reg.
Sess. Act 181).
MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 259.24(1)–(5)
(West,
WestlawNext
through 2013 First
Spec. Sess.).
MISS. CODE ANN.
§§ 93-17-5, 7, 15
(Lexis Advance
through 2013 Reg.
and First and
Second
Extraordinary
Sess.).

Massachusetts

Mississippi

Minnesota

Michigan

Statute

State

Final and irrevocable from the date of execution

After filing of petition to court, but not if child has been placed
for adoption, unless termination is pending when petition is made

Within ten working days after consent is executed; after ten days,
irrevocable except on finding of fraud

No

Yes

Yes

No, but
equivocal

After full
explanation of
relinquishment by
judge, referee, or
other authority
Seventy-two
hours after birth
(but not later than
sixty days after
placement)
Seventy-two
hours after birth

Only upon action to set aside final decree, but no more than six
months after entry of final decree

When can consent be revoked?

Is consent
revocable?

When can
consent be
given?
Four days after
birth

Filed with
Dept. of
Health

Yes

No

Putative
father
registry?
No
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MO. ANN. STAT.
§§ 453.030, 453.040
(West,
WestlawNext
through 2013 First
Reg. Sess.).
MONT. CODE ANN.
§§ 42-2-301–303,
405–418 (West,
WestlawNext
through 2013 Sess.).

NEB. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 43-104–
106.01 (West,
WestlawNext
through 2013 Reg.
Sess.).
NEV. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 127.020–
.110 (West,
WestlawNext
through 2011 Reg.
Sess.).
N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 170-B:3–
B:12 (WestlawNext
through 2013 Reg.
Sess. Ch. 279).

Missouri

Nebraska

New
Hampshire

Nevada

Montana

Statute

State

Yes

Not addressed

Not
addressed

Seventy-two
hours after birth

Only with mutual agreement to revoke by birthparent and
department, agency, or adoptive parent

No

(1) By preponderance of the evidence that surrender was
obtained by fraud or duress, or (2) court determination of best
interests of the child, but (3) may not be withdrawn for any
reason after entry of the final decree

Only if adoptive family is found to be unsuitable or the
placement is in violation of the law; may be invalid if (1) father
of the child marries mother before birth, (2) consent is not
executed within six months of birth, or (3) adoption petition not
filed within two years of birth

Before being reviewed and accepted by a judge (within three
days after signing)

Yes

No

When can consent be revoked?

Is consent
revocable?

(1) Seventy-two
hours after birth;
(2) Unmarried
father: Any time

Seventy-two
hours after birth
and after parent
has received
required
counseling
Forty-eight hours
after birth

When can
consent be
given?
Forty-eight hours
after birth

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

Putative
father
registry?
Yes
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N.J. STAT. ANN.
§§ 9:3-41 to -43,
-45.1 to -48 (West,
WestlawNext
through 2013 Legis.
Sess. Ch. 169).
N.M. STAT. ANN.
§§ 32A-5-17 to -24,
-36, -37 (West,
WestlawNext
through 2013 First
Reg. Sess. Ch. 228).
N.Y. DOM. REL.
LAW §§ 111–111-b;
N.Y. SOC. SERV.
LAW §§ 384–384-c
(McKinney,
WestlawNext
through 2013 Legis.
Sess. Ch. 340).
N.C. GEN. STAT.
§§ 48-3-601 to -609,
-701, -706 (Lexis
Advance through
2013 Reg. Sess.).

New Jersey

North
Carolina

New York

New Mexico

Statute

State

Within seven days of execution; Void if (1) shown by clear and
convincing evidence that it was obtained by fraud or duress;
(2) mutual agreement; (3) petition to adopt is voluntarily
dismissed; or, (4) court dismisses petition to adopt

Yes

(1) Mother: Any
time after birth;
(2) Father: Any
time

Before decree, only by showing of fraud; After decree, for no
reason

No

Judicial consent is irrevocable; Extrajudicial consent is revocable
within forty-five days of execution by written notice, and only if
unopposed; Any consent revocable on proof of fraud, duress, or
coercion

Only at discretion of agency or upon proof of fraud, duress, or
misrepresentation

No

No/Yes

When can consent be revoked?

Is consent
revocable?

Not addressed

When can
consent be
given?
Seventy-two
hours after birth;
Alleged father
may deny
paternity at any
time
Forty-eight hours
after birth

No

Yes

Yes

Putative
father
registry?
No
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N.D. CENT. CODE
§§ 14-15-05 to -08,
-14, -15, -19 (Lexis
Advance through
2013 Reg. Sess.).
OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. §§ 3107.06–
.85 (West,
WestlawNext
through 2013).
OKLA. STAT. tit. 10,
§§ 7503-2.1 to -2.7
(West,
WestlawNext
through 2013 First
Extraordinary
Sess.).

OR. REV. STAT.
§§ 109.312–.346,
418.270 (West,
WestlawNext
through 2013 Reg.
and Spec. Sess.).

North Dakota

Oregon

Oklahoma

Ohio

Statute

State

Before entry of final decree of adoption (unless interlocutory
order has been entered) upon court finding that withdrawal is in
the best interests of the child

(1) Extrajudicial consent is revocable for any reason for fifteen
days after execution of consent; (2) otherwise, consent is
irrevocable, unless it can be shown that setting aside the consent
would be in the best interests of the child and: (a) no petition for
adoption was filed within nine months after placement for
adoption (preponderance standard), (b) another necessary consent
was not executed (preponderance standard), or (c) in cases of
fraud or duress, before entry of the adoption decree or within
three months of discovery of fraud (clear and convincing
standard)
Consent becomes irrevocable, unless fraud or duress concerning
a material fact is proven, on signing of a waiver to appear in
court and certificate of waiver. The waiver only goes into effect
when all of the following conditions have been met: (1) Child is
placed for adoption in the physical custody of person to whom
consent is given; (2) Petition to adopt has been filed; (3) Court
has appointed guardian for the child; (4) An approved home
study has been filed by adoptive parent(s); (5) Adoptive parent(s)
have received information about the child’s social, medical, and

Yes/No

No, but
conditional

(1) Mother: Any
time after birth;
(2) Father of
child born in
wedlock: Any
time after birth;
(3) Putative
Father: Any time

Not addressed

Before entry of decree of adoption upon court finding that
withdrawal is in the best interests of the child

Yes

Yes

When can consent be revoked?

Is consent
revocable?

Seventy-two
hours after birth

When can
consent be
given?
Any time after
birth

No

Yes

Yes

Putative
father
registry?
No
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23 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. §§ 2501–
2505, 2711–2714
(West,
WestlawNext
through 2013 Reg.
Sess.).

R.I. GEN. LAWS
ANN. §§ 15-7-5 to
-21.1 (West,
WestlawNext
through 2013 Reg.
Sess.).
S.C. CODE ANN.
§§ 63-9-310 to -360
(West,
WestlawNext
through 2013 Reg.
Sess.).

Pennsylvania

Rhode Island

South
Carolina

Statute

State

Is consent
revocable?

Yes

No, but
ambiguous

No

When can
consent be
given?

(1) Seventy-two
hours after birth;
(2) Putative
father: Any time

Fifteen days after
birth

Any time after
birth

(1) Consent may be withdrawn on showing that consent was not
voluntarily given or was obtained by duress or coercion and upon
court determination of best interests of the child, but (2) may not
be withdrawn or invalidated for any reason after final decree of
adoption

genetic history; and, (6) Person signing certificate of waiver and
irrevocability has been given notice of right to paid-for adoptionrelated counseling and explanation of consequences of signing
the certificate
(1) Birth father or putative father: thirty days after the birth of the
child or execution of consent, whichever is later; (2) Birth
mother: thirty days after execution of consent; but, (3) consent
may be invalidated by a showing of fraud or duress (by a
preponderance standard if the person giving consent is aged
twenty-one or younger, by a clear and convincing standard in all
other cases) sixty days after birth or execution of consent or
thirty days after entry of the decree of adoption, whichever is
earlier
Consent or court determination that right to consent has been
terminated can only be challenged within 180 days after decree
of adoption is entered; Any challenge brought must show by
clear and convincing evidence that the adoption is not in the best
interests of the child

When can consent be revoked?

Yes

No

Filed with
Dept. of
Public
Welfare

Putative
father
registry?
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S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
§§ 25-5A-4, -16,
25-6-4 to -21
(WestlawNext
through 2013 Reg.
Sess.).
TENN. CODE ANN.
§§ 36-1-110 to -143
(Lexis Advance
through 2013 Reg.
Sess.).

TEX. FAM. CODE
ANN. §§ 161.003–
.007, 161.102–.109,
162.010–.025
(West,
WestlawNext
through 2013 Third
Called Sess.).
UTAH CODE ANN.
§§ 78B-6-111, -120
to -146 (West,
WestlawNext
through 2013
Second Spec. Sess.)

South Dakota

Texas

Utah

Tennessee

Statute

State

Except in cases involving fraud, an action to assert a claim or
right arising from an adoption proceeding must be brought within
two years of finalization.

(1) Within ten days of consent for any reason, but (2) after
expiration of revocation period, may be set aside by the court on
showing, by clear and convincing standard, of fraud, duress,
intentional misrepresentation, or invalidity, but only if action is
initiated within thirty days of execution of consent or entry of
confirmation of consent
(1) Any time prior to final adoption order by filing a signed
revocation, or (2) if affidavit of consent fails to state a period of
time of irrevocability (not to exceed sixty days after execution),
consent can only be revoked within eleven days of signing, but
(3) consent to Dept. of Protective and Regulatory Services or a
licensed child-placing agency is irrevocable

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Three days after
birth (may be
waived by court
for good cause)

(1) Mother:
Forty-eight hours
after birth;
(2) Father (or
alleged father):
Any time

(1) Mother:
Twenty-four
hours after birth;
(2) Father: Any
time

Effective when signed and cannot be revoked

When can consent be revoked?

Is consent
revocable?

When can
consent be
given?
Five days after
birth

Yes

Yes

Yes

Putative
father
registry?
Filed with
Dept. of
Health
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VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
15A, §§ 2-401 to
-409 (Lexis
Advance through
2013 Sess.).

VA. CODE ANN.
§§ 63.2-1202 to
-1205, 63.2-1223 to
-1229, 63.2-1241
(Lexis Advance
through 2013 Reg.
and Spec. Sess.).
WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. §§ 26.33.080–
.130 (West,
WestlawNext
through 2013).

Vermont

Virginia

Washington

Statute

State

When can consent be revoked?

(1) Within twenty-one days of execution of consent, (2) by
agreement of birthparent and adoptive parent or agency that
accepted consent, (3) before adoption decree is entered if fraud or
duress is shown by clear and convincing standard, (4) if petition
to adopt is not filed within forty-five days of placement for
adoption, unless the court has extended the forth-five-day period,
or (5) if a condition permitting revocation is shown by
preponderance standard
(1) Within seven days after execution for any reason (may be
waived if child is at least ten days old), or (2) until entry of final
order of adoption upon proof of fraud or duress or with mutual
consent of birthparents and adoptive parents

(1) Any time before consent is approved by the court, or (2) on
showing of fraud or duress within one year after approval by the
court

Is consent
revocable?
Yes

Yes

Yes

(1) Mother: Three
days after birth;
(2) Father: Any
time

Any time, but
may not be
presented to the
court until fortyeight hours after
birth or fortyeight hours after
signing,
whichever is later

When can
consent be
given?
Thirty-six hours
after birth

No

Yes

Putative
father
registry?
No
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Statute

W. VA. CODE ANN.
§§ 48-22-301 to
-306, 49-3-1 (West,
WestlawNext
through 2013 First
Extraordinary
Sess.).

WISC. STAT. ANN.
§§ 48.41, .415, .837
(West,
WestlawNext
through 2013).

WYO. STAT. ANN.
§§ 1-22-109, -110
(Lexis Advance
through 2013 Reg.
Sess.).

State

West Virginia

Wisconsin

Wyoming

Must be given at
judicial hearing,
not before birth,
but within thirty
days of filing
petition; Nonmarital father
may waive
appearance at
hearing in writing
Any time after
birth

When can
consent be
given?
Seventy-two
hours after birth

No

Can only be revoked if obtained by fraud or duress; Exception: In
the case of denial of adoption based on claim by putative father,
the court may allow the mother to withdraw her consent

(1) Conditional revocation may be provided for expressly in the
written consent under the following circumstances: (a) other
necessary consent is not executed, (b) termination of other
parent’s rights does not occur, or (c) adoptive parent named in
the consent withdraws petition; (2) Absent express conditional
revocation, consent can only be revoked prior to entry of final
adoption order if: (a) birth parent and adoptive parents or agency
agree to revocation, (b) if fraud or duress can be shown, by clear
and convincing standard, within six months of execution of
consent (if later than final entry), (c) a condition allowing
revocation as expressly set forth in the consent has occurred
(preponderance standard), or (d) the consent does not comply
with other requirements (clear and convincing standard)
The judge must inform the consenting parent of the effect of a
voluntary termination of parental rights; A parent who gave
consent to termination of her rights may move the court for relief
within thirty days after entry of the judgment on the following
grounds: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable
neglect, (2) newly discovered evidence that entitles a party to a
new trial, (3) fraud, misrepresentation, or other misconduct, or
(4) a voided judgment or prior judgment on which the judgment
was based that has been reversed or vacated

Yes

Yes, but
ambiguous

When can consent be revoked?

Is consent
revocable?

Yes

No

Putative
father
registry?
No

2014]
WHOSE RIGHTS SHOULD PREVAIL?
393

BELMONT LAW REVIEW

394

[Vol. 1: 343

APPENDIX B: PROPOSED STATUTE
§ 1 Consent.
(a) Consent to an adoption or an affidavit of nonpaternity shall be
executed as follows:
1. If by an agency, by affidavit from its authorized
representative.
2. If by any other person, in the presence of the court or by
affidavit acknowledged before a notary public and in
the presence of two witnesses.
3. If by a court, by an appropriate order or certificate of the
court.
(b) A minor parent has the power to consent to the adoption of his
or her child and has the power to relinquish his or her control or
custody of the child to an adoption entity. Such consent or
relinquishment is valid and has the same force and effect as a
consent or relinquishment executed by an adult parent. A minor
parent, having executed a consent or relinquishment, may not
revoke that consent upon reaching the age of majority or
otherwise becoming emancipated.
(c) A consent or an affidavit of nonpaternity executed by a minor
parent who is 14 years of age or younger must be witnessed by
a parent, legal guardian, or court-appointed guardian ad litem.
(d) The notice and consent provisions of this chapter as they relate
to the father of a child do not apply in cases in which the child
is conceived as a result of a violation of the criminal laws of
this or another state or country, including, but not limited to,
sexual battery, unlawful sexual activity with certain minors,
lewd acts perpetrated upon a minor, or incest.
§ 2 A consent that does not name or otherwise identify the adopting parent
is valid if the consent contains a statement by the person consenting
that the consent was voluntarily executed and that identification of the
adopting parent is not required for granting the consent.
§ 3 Availability of Persons Required to Give Consent.
(a) A good faith and diligent effort must be made to have each
parent whose identity is known and whose consent is required
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interviewed by a representative of the adoption entity before
the consent is executed. A summary of each interview, or a
statement that the parent is unidentified, unlocated, or
unwilling or unavailable to be interviewed, must be filed with
the petition to terminate parental rights pending adoption. The
interview may be excused by the court for good cause.
(b) If any person who is required to consent is unavailable because
the person cannot be located, an affidavit of diligent search
shall be filed.
(c) If any person who is required to consent is unavailable because
the person is deceased, the petition to terminate parental rights
pending adoption must be accompanied by a certified copy of
the death certificate.
§ 4 Execution Procedure, Timing, and Irrevocability.
(a) An affidavit of nonpaternity may be executed before the birth of
the child; however, the consent to an adoption may not be
executed before the birth of the child except in a preplanned
adoption. An affidavit of nonpaternity may be set aside only if
the court finds that the affidavit was obtained by fraud or
duress.
(b) A consent to the adoption of a child who is to be placed for
adoption may be executed by the birthmother 72 hours after the
child’s birth or the day the birthmother is notified in writing,
either on her patient chart or in release paperwork, that she is fit
to be released from the licensed hospital or birth center,
whichever is earlier. A consent by the birthfather may be
executed at any time. The consent is valid upon execution and
may be withdrawn only if the court finds that it was obtained
by fraud or duress.
(c) If the consent of one parent is set aside in accordance with this
chapter, any other consents executed by the other parent or a
third party whose consent is required for the adoption of the
child may not be used by the parent whose consent was set
aside to terminate or diminish the rights of the other parent or
third party whose consent was required for the adoption of the
child.
(d) The consent to adoption or the affidavit of nonpaternity must be
signed in the presence of two witnesses and be acknowledged
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before a notary public who is not signing as one of the
witnesses. The notary public must legibly note on the consent
or the affidavit the date and time of execution. The witnesses’
names must be typed or printed underneath their signatures.
The witnesses’ home or business addresses must be included.
The person who signs the consent or the affidavit has the right
to have at least one of the witnesses be an individual who does
not have an employment, professional, or personal relationship
with the adoption entity or the prospective adoptive parents.
The adoption entity must give reasonable advance notice to the
person signing the consent or affidavit of the right to select a
witness of his or her own choosing. The person who signs the
consent or affidavit must acknowledge in writing on the
consent or affidavit that such notice was given and indicate the
witness, if any, who was selected by the person signing the
consent or affidavit. The adoption entity must include its name,
address, and telephone number on the consent to adoption or
affidavit of nonpaternity.
(e) A consent to adoption being executed by the birthparent must be
in at least 12-point boldfaced type and shall contain the
following recitation of rights:
CONSENT TO ADOPTION
You have the right to select at least one person who does not have an
employment, professional, or personal relationship with the adoption entity
or the prospective adoptive parents to be present when this affidavit is
executed and to sign it as a witness. You must acknowledge on this form
that you were notified of this right and you must indicate the witness or
witnesses you selected, if any.
You do not have to sign this consent form. You may do any of the
following instead of signing this consent or before signing this consent:
1. Consult with an attorney;
2. Hold, care for, and feed the child unless otherwise legally
prohibited;
3. Spend time alone with the child;
4. Place the child in foster care or with any friend or family
member you choose who is willing to care for the child;
5. Take the child home unless otherwise legally prohibited; and,
6. Find out about the community resources that are available to you
if you do not go through with the adoption.
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If you do sign this consent, you are giving up all rights to your child. Your
consent is valid, binding, and irrevocable the moment you sign it except
under specific legal circumstances. If you are giving up your rights to a
newborn child who is to be immediately placed for adoption upon the
child’s release from a licensed hospital or birth center following birth, a
waiting period will be imposed upon the birthmother before she may sign
the consent for adoption. A birthmother must wait 72 hours from the time
of birth, or until the day the birthmother has been notified in writing, either
on her patient chart or in release papers, that she is fit to be released from a
licensed hospital or birth center, whichever is sooner, before the consent for
adoption may be executed. The birthfather may execute consent at any
time. Once you have signed the consent, it is valid, binding, and irrevocable
and cannot be invalidated unless a court finds that it was obtained by fraud
or duress.
If you believe that your consent was obtained by fraud or duress and you
wish to invalidate that consent, you must:
1. Notify the adoption entity, by writing a letter, that you wish to
withdraw your consent; and
2. Prove in court that the consent was obtained by fraud or duress.
§ 5 A copy or duplicate original of each consent signed in an action for
termination of parental rights pending adoption must be provided to the
person who executed the consent to adoption. The copy must be hand
delivered, with a written acknowledgment of receipt signed by the
person whose consent is required at the time of execution. If a copy of a
consent cannot be provided as required in this subsection, the adoption
entity must execute an affidavit stating why the copy of the consent was
not delivered. The original consent and acknowledgment of receipt, or
an affidavit stating why the copy of the consent was not delivered, must
be filed with the petition for termination of parental rights pending
adoption.
§ 6 Counseling.
(a) Counseling of the birthmother is required in department,
agency, and direct parental placement adoptions. If any other
parent is involved in an adoptive placement, counseling of that
parent is encouraged.
(b) Counseling must be performed by a person employed by the
department or by a staff person of a licensed child-placing
agency designated to provide this type of counseling. Unless
the counseling requirement is waived for good cause by a court,
a minimum of 3 hours of counseling must be completed prior to
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execution of a relinquishment of parental rights and consent to
adopt. A relinquishment and consent to adopt executed prior to
completion of required counseling is void.
(c) During counseling, the counselor shall offer an explanation of:
1. adoption procedures and options that are available to a
parent through the department or licensed child-placing
agencies;
2. adoption procedures and options that are available to a
parent through direct parental placement adoptions,
including the right to an attorney and that legal
expenses are an allowable expense that may be paid by
a prospective adoptive parent;
3. the alternative of parenting rather than relinquishing the
child for adoption;
4. the resources that are available to provide assistance or
support for the parent and the child if the parent
chooses not to relinquish the child;
5. the legal and personal effect and impact of terminating
parental rights and of adoption;
6. the options for contact and communication between the
birth family and the adoptive family;
7. postadoptive issues, including grief and loss, and the
existence of a postadoptive counseling and support
program;
8. the fact that the adoptee may be provided with a copy of
the original birth certificate upon request after reaching
18 years of age, unless the birth parent has specifically
requested in writing that the vital statistics bureau
withhold release of the original birth certificate.
(d) The counselor shall prepare a written report containing a
description of the topics covered and the number of hours of
counseling. The report must specifically include the
counselor’s opinion of whether or not the parent understood all
of the issues and was capable of informed consent. The report
must, on request, be released to the person counseled, to the
department, to an agency, or with the consent of the person
counseled, to an attorney for the prospective adoptive parents.

